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ABSTRACT 
IMPARTIALITY, SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS AND COLLECTIVE 
MEMORY: THREE ESSAYS ON TRUST IN POLICE 
Matthew R. Fischer 
July 17, 2019 
This dissertation is an historical and empirical examination of police organizational 
efforts at influencing public perceptions of trust in police. It begins with an historical 
overview of police organizational reform, focusing on the various strategies employed by 
police reformers have attempted to influence public perceptions of police trustworthiness 
and legitimacy. It uses Rothstein’s impartiality as Quality of Government thesis and the 
theory of collective memory to argue for an understanding of the importance of the 
normative context in which police tactics and strategies are deployed for garnering trust in 
police and how the presence of social network effects for trust in police complicate 
contemporary efforts at changing perceptions. The latter part of the dissertation tests for 
the existence of these effects empirically. 
The dissertation is divided into three chapters. Chapter One gives an historical 
overview of police efforts to influence trust in police and argues that reformers have 
overlooked normativity and peer effects as factors influencing trust in police. Chapter Two 
investigates whether, in addition to police performance and procedural fairness, universal 
impartiality is a significant predictor of trust in police. Chapter Three tests for the presence 
of a social network effect for trust in police. It argues that one interpretation of the 
vi 
consequences of the existence of a social network effect for trust in police is that it can lead 
to path dependent outcomes similar to the effects of collective memory.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of trust in police is an important one. It seems that almost daily police 
find themselves in situations where institutionally they take three steps forward and four 
steps back. For every positive in-road police make earning the trust of the people they 
serve, new problems (or persistent old ones) threaten to undo their efforts. Trust in police 
in the United States has been back at its historical average of 52%, with African Americans 
sitting at around 30%. If people do not trust the police it is unlikely that they will cooperate 
with them, which is significant because the police need the cooperation of the public in 
order to co-produce public safety with them. A gap in trust in police means that police are 
less effective at controlling and deterring crime, which can affect how the public evaluate 
police performance, which can lead to decreased public support for police, which makes 
police less effective at their jobs. If enough people lose trust in the police, it may not be 
possible to ever regain that lost trust. Clearly, the stakes for understanding trust in police 
are high. 
While real-world incidents threaten to undermine trust in police, the criminal justice 
literature on trust in police highlights some gaps in scholarly understanding about the 
factors which influence trust in police. The history of criminal justice thinking on the topic 
of trust in police shows that it has only been recently that scholars have been working from 
a reform aimed at improving perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy that has 
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an empirical micro-foundation. However, this literature does not talk about how the 
normative context in which police tactics designed to increase police trust, like the 
procedural fairness perspective, influences individual- and social group-levels of trust in 
police. Second, the extant literature only accounts for the impact of individual perceptions 
on the decision to trust in police without considering that people tend to follow the attitudes 
and behaviors of their social reference groups when making decisions. The current 
dissertation attempts to address these two gaps in the existing literature. 
This dissertation is comprised of three articles which are presented in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4. The first article presents a review of literature organized around the topic of trust 
in police. The review begins with the inception of the so-called professional era of policing 
in the U.S., continuing through to the community policing era up to the present day and the 
advent of the procedural fairness perspective. The strengths and weaknesses of each are 
discussed, leading to the presentation of two critiques based on gaps within the literature. 
The first critique is that trust-building tools, like community policing or procedural 
fairness, must be grounded in a normative value in order to build the kind of broad-based 
trust and legitimacy those perspectives seek. The value of universal (deontological) 
impartiality provides a necessary context to the exercise of tools like procedural justice 
which people use to evaluate their encounters with police. The second is that gaining trust 
and legitimacy for police requires more than a shift police behavior during interpersonal 
contacts because people are also influenced in their attitudes and behavior by their social 
reference group. That people are influenced in their decision to trust police by the 
prevalence of that modality in their social reference group means that programs which only 
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address individual and interpersonal experiences between the police and the public may 
lead to ill-informed decision-making regarding policies designed to engage the citizenry. 
Based on the European Social Survey Round 5, article two develops the first 
critique by examing empirically the concept of universal impartiality and its relevance as 
a factor that influences trust in police. Using structural equation modeling, this article 
demonstrates that, in addition to police performance and procedural fairness, universal 
impartiality is a predictor of trust in police. It is argued that Tyler’s fairness and Rothstein’s 
impartiality are not synonyms but represent two separate and distinct concepts, one of 
which is based on subjective perceptions (fairness) and the other which is a universal and 
an absolute (impartiality). The consequences discussed in the conclusion of the article are 
the following: impartiality is not an objective truth discovered by this study, but are instead, 
owing to the survey nature of the data set, what people expect from their police institutions. 
Finally, the third article analyzes differences in individual levels of police trust 
using the concept of social network effects. The basic idea is that a person’s decision to 
trust the police is at least partially dependent on the trusting culture in the city in which 
respondents live. Based on the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the F.B.I.’s Uniform 
Crime Report and the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics data 
sets, an instrumental variable probit regression model was built to model trust in police 
mode choice as a function of personal, crime and city-specific variables, including network 
effects. Two city-level instrumental variables are used, based on U.S. Census data for 
median household income per capita and F.B.I. violent crime data, and found that a social 
network effect exists and can be derived quantitatively which permits measuring effect 
sizes. Since there is empirical evidence that trust in police decision-making depends on 
4 
network effects, police scholars may wish to focus not only on the quality of interpersonal 
contact but also the context in which those contacts are handled. A tie-in to universal 
impartiality is proposed as a way to address the influence of the social network effect. 
The dissertation finishes up with a brief conclusion, summarizing the results, 
presenting the limitations and giving an outlook on further research in the area of police 
trust, impartiality and social network effects. 
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CHAPTER II 
TRUST IN POLICE: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND TWO EXPANSIONS 
Introduction 
In the recent past there have been a number of high profile killings of unarmed 
African American males at the hands of police officers which has led to widespread protest 
against police violence across the country (e.g., Eric Garner, Michael Brown), the deaths 
of African Americans in police custody (e.g., Sandra Bland and Freddie Gray) and the 
perceived failure of the criminal justice system to yield convictions in these and other 
instances. The consequences of these high-profile events have been a decrease in trust and 
confidence in the police. For example, a Gallup poll published in 2015 saw trust and 
confidence among US residents tied with 1993 for the record low of 52% (Jones 2015). 
Further, a Pew Research poll reporting on the changes in rates of trust and confidence in 
the police by comparing 2015-2017 to 2012-2014 benchmarks found that that trust and 
confidence in the police decreased among Hispanics (2012-2014: 59%; 2015-2017: 45%), 
liberals (2012-2014: 51%; 2015-2017: 39%) and people under the age of 30 (2012-2014: 
56%; 2015-2017: 44%) to below 50%. That same poll showed that for African Americans, 
trust and confidence in the police remains low: trust decreased from 35% to 30% over that 
same period (ibid.).  
The scenario described above is not new for police in the United States. Going back 
to the 1930s, police scholars and practitioners have sought ways of improving the image 
of police in the eyes of the public in order to gain the public’s trust and support (Fogelson 
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1977; Moore and Kelling 1983). Over the years, police reformers proposed a number of 
organizational strategies which sought by various means to increase public perceptions of 
police trustworthiness and legitimacy. Those strategies are: the police performance model, 
community policing and the procedural fairness perspective. The police performance 
model was an implicit trust model in that up to that point in U.S. history the police had a 
reputation for political meddling and corruption (ibid.). Early police reformers recast the 
police in the mold of J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation which made 
policing a professional career concerned only with the biggest crimes and the surest solves 
(Kelling and Moore 1988). The subsequent community policing philosophy was a reaction 
to the social and political isolation of police which occurred as a result of the professional 
model (Greene 2000). The goal was to encourage the public to coproduce public safety 
with the police and to build trust through these efforts (Rosenbaum 1988; Lurigio and 
Rosenbaum 1986). Yet, the failure to explicitly theorize and empirically scrutinize on the 
topic of police trust formation was a weakness of these early organizational attempts 
(Moore and Kelling 1983; Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter and Bennett 2014). Although the 
police performance model and the community policing philosophy1 remain the 
organizational paradigm in many departments (Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson 2001; Zhao, 
He and Lovrich 2003), the procedural fairness perspective, which is the most recent effort 
to build trust between police and the public, has received a great deal of scholarly attention 
over the past 20 years. Following the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 
which advocated for legitimacy to be the goal of police reform in the United States (2015), 
1 There are more departments that use the police performance model than the community policing philosophy. 
Trojanowicz, Kapeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux (1998), as well as Zhao, He and Lovrich (2003) point out that 
many departments have adopted the language of community policing while the core functions of policing 
have not changed from the traditional police performance model. 
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the procedural fairness perspective proceeds from an individual motive-based model of 
trust that puts emphasis on the quality of interpersonal treatment and decision-making as 
the core components of improving perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy 
(Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Murphy and Tyler 2017). 
Examining historical attempts to influence public trust in police and understanding 
where those attempts are weak is important to developing a more complete conceptual 
picture of how police action influences public perceptions of police. This is certainly the 
case with the procedural fairness perspective which built upon the lessons of the police 
performance and community policing models to focus on the conduct of officers during 
interpersonal interactions with members of the public. However, while the procedural 
fairness perspective contributes greatly to understanding how perceived procedural 
fairness in police-public encounters can lead to increased perceptions of police 
trustworthiness and legitimacy, thinking about trust in police can still be extended. It is the 
goal of this paper to highlight two related points which delve deeper into the factors that 
influence trust in police. The first is that because individuals are embedded into social 
networks and those networks influence the individual’s behavior that dealing with mistrust 
of the police must be expanded if it is to counteract the influence of that network. The 
second is that the most recent effort at trust-building, the procedural fairness perspective, 
needs a normative foundation to guide its implementation and use or it could be used as 
window-dressing to deal with negative public relations crises as the police performance 
model and the community policing philosophy before it. 
The remainder of this essay unfolds as follows. The first section presents an 
historical review of literature organized around the theme of police organizational attempts 
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in the United States to improve perceptions of trustworthiness and legitimacy. Based on 
the review, section two provides two arguments for extending thinking about trust in police, 
namely, a) that trust-building more generally and procedural fairness more specifically 
need to be grounded in a normative framework to guide the exercise of public authority in 
such a way that procedural fairness can work and b) that focusing only on individual police-
public interactions as the unit of trust analysis does not adequately account for the influence 
of social networks on individual decisions. Section three brings these two extensions 
together into a conceptual model before concluding. 
Review of Literature 
Police Performance. While it is not stated outright, implicit in the traditional crime 
control and deterrence model of policing is the notion that how well police do their jobs 
influences citizen satisfaction with and instrumental trust in police. If the public do not 
perceive the police as at least somewhat competent at their jobs they are unlikely to reward 
them with a high degree of satisfaction, trust or legitimacy. The genesis of the performance 
model can be traced back to the inception of the so-called professional era of policing 
instituted in the 1930s (and continued well on into the present day) which sought to change 
the image of policing in the eyes of the public (Fogelson 1977; Kelling and Moore 1988; 
Greene 2000). Until that time, policing in the United States was deeply intertwined with 
local politics as ward bosses and their political machines used publicly funded police forces 
to secure their community power base (e.g., distributing rewards in exchange for favorable 
voting behavior, etc.), leading to a reputation for abuse of police authority and the 
corruption of police institutions. The rise of the municipal reform movement and the 
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passage of the Pendleton Act (1883) saw major changes in the way police forces were 
organized and their relationship to local political authorities: police would become the most 
autonomous part of municipal government. Police reformers August Vollmer (1876-1955) 
and O.W. Wilson’s (1900-1972) vision for a reformed police force was to adopt a narrow 
crime-fighting focus similar to what J. Edgar Hoover had done with the F.B.I. Police would 
become highly professional, adopting an impersonal, authoritative demeanor when 
interacting with citizens, and incorporate the latest in rapid response technology to improve 
police performance and to project force across entire cities. The goal of these reforms was 
to make the police more predictable, official and to imbue them with specialized crime-
control and deterrence knowledge which would, in turn, rehabilitate the image of the police 
in the public’s eyes and regain their trust through police professionalism and performance. 
The professional era of policing was born. 
The heyday of the professional era model of gaining trust through performance 
lasted until the late 1960s/early 1970s when it met with a series of issues that highlighted 
some of its weaknesses. The first issue with the professional era’s police performance 
model is that police performance, like that of other public services, is empirically difficult 
to assess because police work is multifaceted and often unseen by the public (e.g., Parks, 
et al. 1981). In the case of police work, it is frequently assumed that police performance 
can be measured based on arrest, clearance and crime rates or numbers of calls for service 
each have their own weaknesses (see: O’Brien 1996; Alpert and Moore 1993; Alpert, Flynn 
and Piquero 2001; Connell, Miggans and McGloin 2008). However, arrest and clearance 
rates may be high without leading to a reduction in crime rate because such rates do not 
account for the disposition of a case (i.e., how many cleared cases resulted in a conviction, 
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how many suspects were arrested without charges being brought, etc.). The number of calls 
for service can be influenced by both the presence or absence of satisfaction with and trust 
in police services, therefore making it a poor measure police performance. Further, research 
into the effectiveness of police tactics revealed that police working by themselves could do 
little to prevent, deter or solve crimes. Moore and Kelling (1983) state that in cases of 
property crimes without witnesses, police were successful in solving them (i.e., bringing 
charges against a suspect, being adjudicated in court) one out of five times (see also: 
Spelman and Brown 1984; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman and Brown 1974; see also: Sampson, 
Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson and Bartusch 1998). Moreover, although crime 
control and deterrence at its most essential level tries to be a preventative strategy, it tends 
in practice to be reactive, which raises questions regarding the role police play in crime 
control and deterrence. Thus, although police performance was in theory related to the 
ability of police to control and deter crime, providing evidence to support that claim proved 
difficult. 
Related to the difficulty of measuring empirically police performance, the second 
issue for the model was that the non-crime control-based order maintenance activities were 
more effective at increasing the public’s perception of safety and, by extension, the amount 
of trust they placed in police. Findings from several foot patrol experiments nationwide 
found that fear of crime, not actual crime rates, was driven by public perceptions of social 
disorder (Spelman and Brown 1984; Kelling, Pate, Dieckman and Brown 1974; Bursik and 
Grasmick 1993). The discovery that perceptions of order and not actual crime rates was 
related to citizen fear of crime challenged one of the core tenets of professional policing 
model, namely, that perceptions of public safety would lead to satisfaction with and trust 
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in police through police performance (Greene 2000). Researchers discovered that visible 
signs of disorder, including but not limited to graffiti, vagrancy, public intoxication, 
abandoned parks and broken windows were interpreted as signals by local residents and 
potential offenders that public spaces were unmonitored and unprotected, which had the 
effect of driving residents out of those spaces and back into their residences while 
simultaneously inviting anti-social elements into them (Wilson and Kelling 1982; see also 
Sampson and Bartusch 1998; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Although maintaining public 
order had always been a considered a component of police work, since the professional era, 
order maintenance was viewed as the secondary role of police behind the primary role of 
the police as crime-fighting experts. But if perceptions of safety, and, by extension, the 
decision to trust police are related to the secondary role and not the first, however, questions 
can be raised regarding the claims made about that model. 
The third problem with the professional era’s performance model was that the 
adoption of rapid patrol and response technology had isolated police socially from the 
public which meant that opportunities for trust-building and information gathering were 
reduced (Greene 1987, 2000; Kelling and Moore 1988; Moore and Kelling 1983; 
Trojanowicz 1986). Along with the discovery that the police could do little to control and 
deter crime by themselves was the parallel realization that police needed public cooperation 
with the police (e.g., willingness to follow police directives, willingness to pass on 
information) in order to carry out their primary function effectively. The problem for the 
professional era performance model was that it had lost trust and legitimacy in the eyes of 
a proportion of the public, particularly among minority groups living in disadvantaged, 
high crime neighborhoods, through the impersonal way officers treated members of the 
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public, the use of increasingly militant tactics and the social isolation inherent in choice of 
transportation modality (i.e., driving a patrol car versus walking a beat) (Greene 2000; Gill, 
et al. 2014). Coupled with the previous two issues, isolating police from the public only 
served to make police officers’ jobs more difficult and less likely to provide evidence of 
effective police performance, which meant that the likelihood of the police changing public 
perceptions of trust was low. 
In all, despite its intuitive appeal, the professional era’s police performance model 
represents an early attempt and failure at garnering public satisfaction with, trust in and 
legitimacy for the institution of the police. A variety of issues, including measurement 
problems, role mismatch and social isolation undermined the model and left scholars and 
practitioners searching for an alternative that would directly address the public’s lack of 
trust in the police. The Community era of policing would build upon the foundation laid 
by the professional era and to deploy a new philosophy: community policing. 
Community Policing. The community policing philosophy was developed in part 
as a response to the shortcomings of the professional era’s police performance model of 
crime control and deterrence: crime rates soared during the 1970s while police tactics 
before and during race riots were scrutinized in national commission reports on crime and 
police clashed violently with civil rights activists and Vietnam anti-war protesters on 
broadcast television (Rosenbaum 1988, Greene 2000; Gill et al. 2014). At the same time, 
two important discoveries – that fear of crime and disorder led members of the public to 
abandon public spaces and that police could do little to control and deter crime by 
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themselves – highlighted the need for a new approach to crime control that focused on 
order maintenance and the strengthening of neighborhood informal social control (Wilson 
and Kelling 1982; Skogan 1986; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). To make this new strategy 
work required cooperation between the police and the public to monitor public spaces and 
report crime. But attaining public cooperation would prove difficult for two reasons. First, 
police organizational legitimacy and performance was undermined by their seeming 
inability to control soaring crime rates (Greene 2000; Kelling and Moore 1988). Second, 
and most relevant for the topic of this paper, cooperation requires the public to trust the 
police, and for many, particularly among communities of color, trust was not immediately 
forthcoming. 
The community policing philosophy has thus been studied over the past 40 years 
for its potential to a) reduce crime and fear of crime and b) improve police-public relations 
(Greene 2000; Fisher-Stewart 2007; Crowl 2017; Gill, et al. 2014). The most general 
conceptual model for community policing holds that increases in the quantity of police-
public interactions will lead to greater crime control, deterrence, reductions in fear of crime 
and improvements in public trust for police (Moore, Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988: 8). It 
was thought to build trust between the police and the public through increased opportunities 
for social interaction as both groups work together to co-produce/improve a 
neighborhood’s capacity for informal social control which together can indirectly have an 
impact on crime rates (Greene 2000; Trojanowicz, Gaines, Kappeler and Bucqueroux 
1998). Community policing officers would also get out of their cars and walk a 
geographically stable beat to maximize opportunities for intelligence gathering and trust-
building (Trojanowicz 1986).  
14 
Co-production was also a major theme of the community policing philosophy. Co-
production is the idea that the consumers of a particular good or service can also contribute 
to the production of that good or service (for an overview, see: Parks, et al. 1981). Co-
production is thought to be a way of making the providers of a public good or service more 
responsive to the needs of the people they served. Thus, in the case of community policing, 
the police and the community might come together to work on a neighborhood watch 
program in which police would hear from residents regarding crime problems in that area 
and then, with the community, engage in problem-solving to deal with that problem (e.g., 
Alpert and Moore 1993; Alpert, Flynn and Piquero 2001).  
Community policing reformers proposed three changes to the structure and 
mandate of police organizations to facilitate these goals (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines 
and Bucqueroux 1998; Kelling and Moore 1988; Cordner 2001). First, whereas the 
professional era’s organizational structure was a strict vertical hierarchy with decision-
making authority resting at the top, community policing advocated a decentralized 
framework that gave greater latitude to officers in the field to deal with issues and thus to 
be more responsive to neighborhood or community concerns (Cordner 2001; Rosenbaum 
1988). It has been argued that increasing the discretion available to “street-level 
bureaucrats” such as police will afford them more flexibility in problem-solving and even 
increase the likelihood of achieving socially equitable outcomes (Lipsky 2010; Maynard-
Moody, Musheno and Musheno 2003; Maynard-Moody and Leland 2000). 
Second, order maintenance activities which had during the professional era taken a 
secondary role to professional crime-fighting became a core component of efforts to 
combat fear of crime and encourage the public to retake their guardianship role over public 
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spaces (Cordner 2001; Rosenbaum 1988; Goldstein 1979). Police cannot be everywhere, 
so the public must contribute to monitoring and enforcing informal neighborhood order 
(Rosenbaum 1988). If visible signs of disorder create fear and make citizens avoidant of 
public spaces, restoring neighborhood order should lead again to public participation 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982). In reprioritizing order maintenance activities, reformers sought 
to create opportunities for police-public collaboration which would strengthen the informal 
capacity of the neighborhood to fight crime and maintain order. 
Third, and a corollary of the decentralization of decision-making authority, 
community policing sought to incorporate the public more into the problem-solving 
process for crime in their area (Goldstein 1979; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson 2011; 
Gill et al. 2014). As with prioritizing order maintenance activities, incorporating residents 
into the process of finding solutions to local crime problems creates opportunities for social 
interactions and goal-driven cooperation which has been found in other contexts to 
generate social capital and trust between and among participants (see: Putnam, 2000; 
Ostrom 1990; Sampson 2012). Bringing residents into the problem-solving process would 
likely also result in some informational spillovers that would make residents more effective 
at controlling and deterring future disturbances to neighborhood order (Gill et al. 2014; 
Goldstein 1979; Bursik and Grasmick 1993). 
However, like the professional era’s police performance model before it, the impact 
of community policing on crime, fear of crime and trust in police has been difficult to 
assess empirically, and this difficulty can be attributed to the lack of a coherent conceptual 
model connecting the content of community policing programs to specific outcomes 
(Fielding 2005; Lurigio and Rosenbaum 1986; Gill et al. 2014). There is currently no 
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explicit theoretical foundation for community policing or conceptual model upon which 
criminal justice scholars agree (e.g., Cordner 2001; Oliver and Bartgis 1998), though a few 
prominent researchers (e.g., Kelling and Moore 1988; Trojanowicz 1986; Moore, 
Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988: 8) have alluded the existence of such an underlying social 
interaction theory for community policing but this theory has not been developed or 
mentioned in subsequent research. A consequence of the lack of theoretical foundation has 
been that although community policing programs can be found in most metropolitan police 
departments across the United States (Zhao and Thurman 1997; Zhao, Lovrich and 
Robinson 2001), community policing programs bear little resemblance to one another and 
thus generally defy comparison (e.g., Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Lurigio and 
Rosenbaum 1994; Gill et al., 2014). Even on occasions where comparison is possible (e.g., 
similarly sized patrol beats, police department size, experimental and control areas, etc.), 
few studies describe in detail what police did during the program which is of great interest 
to researchers looking to reveal causality (Connell, Miggans and McGloin 2008). 
As of the time of writing and to the best of this author’s knowledge, there are no 
studies which specifically assess the impact of community policing activities on trust in 
police, which makes assessing community policing’s trust-building component unfeasible. 
This finding was a surprise given the number of scholars advancing the claim that 
community policing involves trust-building (e.g., Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and 
Bucqueroux 1998). There have been a number of studies that have looked at public 
satisfaction with policing services which compare the service delivery of large, highly 
centralized urban police departments characteristic of the police performance model with 
smaller, more decentralized community police departments indicative of community 
17 
policing units (e.g., Ostrom and Whitaker 1973, 1974). While not a direct measure of trust, 
satisfaction with service findings can at least be argued on conceptual grounds to be a 
correlate of trust: if an individual is satisfied with a particular service or product, in all 
likelihood that individual also trusts the quality of the products and services delivered by 
that producer and will continue to use them (e.g., Ranaweera and Prabhu 2003). 
The empirical record for community policing’s effect on crime has been mixed. 
Systematic analysis of community policing’s effectiveness has been rare (Weisburd and 
Eck 2004). In their comprehensive review of the community policing literature since 1970, 
Gill et al. (2014: 412) found that in only 36.2% of the 47 comparison studies they surveyed 
showed a positive effect (i.e., reduction) on crime while an equal proportion indicated the 
opposite. Further, using longitudinal data to analyze a community policing program 
deployed in the suburbs, Connell, Miggans and McGloin (2008), who studied the impact 
of an officer-initiated community policing initiative on crime located in the suburbs of a 
major metropolitan area, concluded that the program was successful at lowering property 
crime rates in the area as a result of police-citizen interaction, but they also mentioned that 
their assessment was only possible because of the in-depth description of the intervention 
provided by police.  
The community policing philosophy is, despite its indeterminate empirical record, 
an important step on the path to improving the police-public trust relationship. Community 
policing reformers, aware of the importance of personal contact and non-enforcement-
related social interaction to gaining trust and cooperation in enforcement-related situations, 
set forth to design an approach to policing that at least nominally assigned a greater degree 
of importance to the police-public trust relationship. While community policing continues 
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to be a topic of consideration in the criminal justice literature on police-public cooperation, 
another more empirically grounded theory has risen to prominence in the search for 
improving public perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy. That theory is the 
procedural fairness (justice) perspective. 
Procedural Fairness. Despite the indeterminant effect of community policing on 
trust in police, the community policing philosophy highlighted conceptually the 
importance of social interactions for building positive perceptions of police officers and 
police institutions. Like the community policing philosophy before it, the procedural 
fairness and police legitimacy argument builds upon the insights gleaned from the previous 
generation’s efforts. However, unlike the police performance and community policing 
models, procedural fairness has an empirical micro-foundation which supports its core 
claim. This has translated into the procedural fairness and police legitimacy perspective 
receiving a great deal of scholarly attention in efforts to rehabilitate the image of police 
officers and institutions. 
The procedural fairness position holds that procedural fairness predicts trust in 
police and improves perceptions of police legitimacy (Tyler 1990, 2003). Legitimacy for 
police is important because individuals who view the police as legitimate are more likely 
to defer to them, cooperate with them and obey the law (Tyler 1990). The evaluation of 
procedural fairness takes places across two distinct axes: the quality of interpersonal 
treatment and the quality of decision-making (Tyler and Blader 2000). The quality of 
interpersonal treatment refers to the degree to which officers treat members of the public 
with dignity and respect while the quality of decision-making deals with the extent to which 
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officers explain their decisions, are perceived to be neutral and allow for members of the 
public to provide input. Perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy are improved 
when police officers treat people fairly and with respect, explaining why officers made a 
particular decision and inviting and respecting input from those with whom they come into 
contact. If people witness police interacting with members of the public in these ways or 
are themselves subject to them, they infer that the larger organization is procedurally fair 
and therefore have trust in the institution of the police as well as support that institution’s 
policies as legitimate, which means that they are more likely to cooperate with police and 
follow the law (Tyler 1990 2003, 2005; Murphy and Tyler 2017; Hough, Jackson and 
Bradford 2013; Tyler and Fagan 2008). Fairness of interactions is determined by individual 
subjective perceptions; there are no universal standards by which procedural fairness is 
measured (Tyler 2003).  
 The empirical base supporting the claim that the legitimacy of police institutions is 
derived from citizens’ subjective perceptions that those institutions are procedurally fair is 
robust, both within its original Anglo-American context (Hinds and Murphy 2007; 
Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003; Tyler and Blader 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002) and 
outside in places such as Ghana, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Hungary (e.g., 
Tankebe 2009; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012; Moravcová 2016). Research into 
procedural fairness looks not only on its impact on individual perceptions of police 
legitimacy alone but has also compared procedural fairness to other predictors of 
willingness to trust and cooperate with police: distributive justice and police performance. 
Although the convergent and discriminant validity of the procedural fairness concept 
remains a source of tension (Gau 2011), the prevailing result has been that, ceteris paribus, 
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procedural fairness remains the most important predictor of public cooperation with police. 
For example, Tyler and Sunshine (2003) in a survey of over 1,600 residents of New York 
examining the antecedents of procedural justice found that, across all ethnicities, the 
quality of decision-making and the quality of interpersonal treatment comprised the main 
predictors of procedural fairness. In that same study, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) report on 
the factors which influence public support of police and policing activities and discovered 
that perceptions of police legitimacy predict cooperation and compliance with the police 
and the willingness to entrust police with broader discretion in their everyday tasks of 
maintaining law and order. The findings of Sunshine and Tyler (2003) echo the findings of 
Tyler and Huo (2002) in a survey of 1,656 people living in and around Oakland and Los 
Angeles which indicated individuals’ evaluations of procedural fairness predicted both 
their satisfaction with the decision-maker and their willingness to accept a decision. 
However, even though the effects of procedural fairness are improved perceptions of 
trustworthiness and legitimacy, much of the evidence supporting these effects uses trust as 
an explanatory variable examining the impact of different types of trust (e.g., trust in 
procedural fairness, trust in distributive fairness) on self-reported willingness to comply 
with the law and legal authorities (see: Tyler 2005; Jackson, Hough, Bradford, Hohl and 
Kuha 2012; Hough Jackson and Bradford 2013; Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton 2017). 
This review of literature on previous research into trust in police highlights the 
major theme in the development of thinking regarding generating trust in police, which is 
the need for police and public to trust one another and work together. The irony of police 
performance model of the professional era was that the adoption of rapid response 
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technologies and a professional, paternalistic demeanor by police, both of which were 
designed to rehabilitate the reputation of police in the United States from being corrupt and 
political to being beyond reproach and neutral, were arguably the factors which contributed 
to an overall decrease in police effectiveness at stopping or deterring crime as police 
became isolated from the public. The simultaneous recognition that the public and the 
police co-produce public safety meant that, in order to maximize the use of limited police 
resources, cooperation between the police and the public was necessary in order to produce 
public safety (co-production). Police efforts to reach the public became the defining 
characteristic of the community policing philosophy. Getting police out of cars and closer 
to the people, despite its order maintenance purposes, was a clear attempt at putting police 
and the public into situations where they might engage in social interactions. Creating 
opportunities for police and public to work together to bring about changes in the safety of 
their neighborhoods is in-line with research suggesting that co-production generates social 
capital and trust (e.g., Ostrom and Ahn 2008; Putnam 2000). Unfortunately, the community 
policing philosophy lacked coherence as an organizational change philosophy and its goal 
of improving the police-public trust relationship eventually took a backseat to familiar 
crime control and deterrence strategies. The community policing philosophy also did not 
explicitly theorize on how to generate trust and cooperation when it was not forthcoming, 
as was the case in high crime, high poverty areas and minority communities. The 
procedural fairness perspective utilizes advances in social psychology to address the lack 
of theorization on social interactions and trust in the community policing and police 
performance models. Procedural fairness operates in interactions between police and the 
public by treating members of the public with dignity and respect and by appearing neutral 
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and transparent in decision-making. Empirical research backs up the procedural fairness 
perspective’s claims to this, which also departs from previous scholarship. 
Two Critiques and an Extension 
When it comes to understanding what people consider procedurally fair in 
encounters with police, the procedural fairness perspective is well-equipped to provide an 
answer, but there are two ways in which thinking about trust in police more broadly and 
procedural fairness more specifically can be extended to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of what influences public trust in police. The first is that although people 
respond favorably to procedural fairness, without a normative principle to guide its 
application, the procedural fairness perspective may fall into a “procedural trap” wherein 
authorities use procedures to focus attention away from substantive issues like systemic 
racism, abuse of authority and state-sanctioned violence. The second is that the procedural 
fairness perspective’s focus is on the individual social interaction, but the presence of a 
social network effect for trust in police would mean that people are often influenced in 
their decision to adopt a particular behavior by the prevalence of that behavior in their 
reference group and thus that the decision to trust is affected by more than individual social 
interactions. The extension is that universal impartiality is needed for an indirect big bang 
approach to get out of the procedural (and social) trap. 
Universal impartiality. The community policing philosophy has been criticized as 
being window dressing for police departments that find themselves in difficult political 
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situations with the public they serve (e.g., Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux 
1998; Gill et al. 2014; Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Greene and Mastrofski 1988; Zhao, 
Lovrich and Robinson 2001; Zhao, He and Lovrich 2003). Police executives could then 
proclaim that they were “doing something” to address citizen concerns about police 
violence, abuse of authority, systemic racism and other forms of corruption without taking 
other steps to reform or reorganize their organization or while using the language of 
community policing as a “cover for use of aggressive law enforcement tactics rather than 
serving the needs of their communities”  (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux 
1998: 3; see also: Crank 1994; Crank and Langworthy 1992). Supporting this claim is a 
study by Zhao, Lovrich and Robinson (2001) which examined change in three core 
functions of American policing under community policing (crime control, order 
maintenance and service provision) using panel data from national surveys of more than 
200 municipal police departments conducted between 1993 and 19962. Their findings 
indicated that the three core functions of police have remained mostly unchanged during 
that period which the authors comment “seems to represent a method of strategic buffering 
of a largely unaltered core police operation reflective of the professional model” (ibid.: 
365; see also: Zhao, He and Lovrich 2003).  
The problem with the community policing philosophy, and to a similar extent the 
police performance and procedural fairness perspectives, is that they are essentially 
consequentialist in nature. They focus attention on the benefits to society of increased trust 
 
2 Although scholars differ on the starting decade for the community policing philosophy, a number of 
researchers have identified the 1990s as the high watermark for community policing, particularly after then 
President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which created the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services to disburse discretionary funds to police agencies claiming 
to engage in community policing (e.g., Zhao, Scheider and Thurman 2002). 
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in police, improved perceptions of police legitimacy and greater public compliance with 
the law, all of which are laudable goals, but if there is no normative framework to guide 
the behavior of the organization, that it could fall into what Tankebe calls a “procedural 
trap” in which “legal and political authorities tend to focus attention on procedural justice 
in order to deflect attention away from more substantive issues” (2009: 14). In other words, 
much in the same way that the community policing philosophy was criticized for being a 
means of placating public outcry over police behavior (Greene and Mastrofski 1988; 
Rosenbaum and Lurigio 1994; Trojanowicz, Kappeler, Gaines and Bucqueroux 1998), the 
procedural fairness perspective is an instrument that can be used to fulfill the agenda of 
whoever wields it because the basis of fairness judgments are the subjective evaluations of 
individuals in contact with the police rather than a universal value or norm. What is needed 
to gain broad-based trust and legitimacy in police is the adoption of a normative framework 
to guide organizational behavior, such as Bo Rothstein’s Quality of Government thesis, 
which contends that public agencies which exercise their authority in a universal and 
impartial way enjoy greater trust and legitimacy because police tactics like those employed 
in the procedural fairness argument because they are intrinsically valuable given the 
inherent value of human life (Rothstein 2011). 
Rothstein defines impartiality in the execution of public authority in the following 
way: “[W]hen implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take into 
consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not stipulated beforehand in the policy 
or the law” (Rothstein 2011: 13). In other words, when wielding public power, agents of 
the state should do so in a predictable and unbiased way, in accordance with legal 
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stipulations3. Rothstein does not mean by this that no concerns other than those enshrined 
in law beforehand should be taken into account; it would be reasonable, for example, for 
time and budget constraints to be considered. But rather he places emphasis on the fact that 
no characteristics of the citizen or case outside of those stipulated in law or policy should 
be taken into consideration. He writes: “QoG [Quality of Government] as impartiality is 
procedural, which means that it can encompass very different policies and does not rule 
out support for specific groups or interests” (Rothstein 2011: 14). By way of example, 
Rothstein submits that, in terms of social policy, it would not violate the principle of 
impartiality to enact a law supporting poor families with children, but denying those same 
benefits to people from a specific ethnic background or to parents with a particular sexual 
orientation would (ibid.). 
The argument made for universal impartiality being the basic norm which guides 
the exercise of police authority is that impartiality is, in addition to other police models 
reviewed in this paper, an important factor predicting trust in police, not a replacement for 
it. Much of the research on procedural fairness indicates that, net of other influences, 
including police performance and distributive fairness, procedural fairness is the most 
important predictor of willingness to cooperate with the police. However, trust is usually 
an explanans for self-reported compliance behavior rather than the outcome variable. 
Despite this, the standard claim about the workings of procedural fairness is that it 
improves perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy, so at least on a conceptual 
3 It is important to note here that Rothstein’s conceives of laws as necessarily affirming human rights and 
dignity, which makes his view on impartiality similar in practice to the German rechstaat in which the power 
of the state is constrained by the law. The rechstaat is similar to the Anglo-American concept of rule of law 
but differs in that it also emphasizes what is just based on equity, philosophy, ethics, law, etc. In this way, 
the rechstaat protects citizens from the arbitrary use of power by the state. 
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level procedural fairness should influence trust in police. A handful of studies have also 
compared the procedural fairness to the professional era police performance model in terms 
of which better predicts self-reported compliance with the law (e.g., Jackson et al. 2012; 
Hough, et al. 2013; Tyler 2005). The inclusion of police performance in a model exploring 
the impact of procedural fairness and universal impartiality on trust in police would be 
justified on the grounds that a) police performance makes an implicit trust claim and b) 
given the findings of Zhao, He and Lovrich (2003) that the core functions of policing have 
changed little from the days of the police performance model, it can be argued that that 
police performance model never really fell out of fashion and thus represents the standard 
way in which police organizations operate. Rothstein does not explicitly state that 
impartiality should lead to increased trust in police, but he does argue that governments 
which do not practice the ideal of impartiality in the implementation of public policy are 
viewed as illegitimate and untrustworthy (Rothstein 2011).  
It might be argued by some that procedural fairness and impartiality are the same 
thing. It is problematic that both Tyler and Rothstein interchange the terms “fair” and 
“impartial” in their work. Although both theories use these terms as near synonyms, these 
terms differ in two important ways. First, as has been previously discussed, Tyler’s fairness 
is based upon subjective perceptions of police treatment from the perspective of the 
individual which means that what is fair can vary depending upon the individual doing the 
evaluating. Under this subjective view of fairness, it is possible that an action may be 
deemed fair by one person, yet that action may not be impartial. Someone may sanction 
aggressive policing tactics towards and harsher sentences for individuals from a particular 
ethnic background and see this as fair, but the actions the individual proposes would not 
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be universally impartial because the tactics do not apply to everyone and are not stipulated 
by law. Universal impartiality, on the other hand, is an absolute: it applies to everyone 
(universal) and individuals are either regarded impartially (i.e., reliably and without bias) 
or not. In this way, universal impartiality is the expectation and the value by which 
judgments regarding fairness ought to be made. This makes fairness a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for impartiality, because while it is possible to say that all which is 
impartial is fair, it is not possible to say that all which is fair is also impartial.  
The second way in which procedural fairness and impartiality are different is that 
impartiality is concerned with the exercise of public authority whereas procedural fairness 
is concerned with the posture taken by agents of the state when interacting with the public, 
meaning that impartiality is a more encompassing concept that procedural fairness. Fair 
procedure is concerned with the subjective perceptions of the fairness of those who are 
subject to the “procedures” but not to the substantive criminal procedures, such as offering 
a Miranda warning, having the effective assistance of counsel at trial, the prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment, etc. Impartiality, by contrast, would apply to the manner in 
which police interact with members of the public (all citizens deserve to be treated with 
dignity and to understand what is happening to them) as well as to the substantive content 
of criminal procedure (all citizens deserve a Miranda warning, all citizens should be 
protected in their persons from harm while in custody, etc.). 
 
Social network effects. The second critique in thinking about trust in police is that 
the procedural fairness perspective’s focus on individual social interactions does not 
acknowledge the fact that people are often influenced in their decision to adopt a particular 
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behavior by the prevalence of that behavior in their reference group and thus that the 
decision to trust is influenced by more than individual social interactions. It is not entirely 
clear from the police performance model or the community policing philosophy how police 
ought to engage the community so as to bring about a trust-based outcome, though for 
community policing it is likely that it used the same the sort of blanket approach taken by 
the police performance perspective. Tyler’s conceptual model of process-based regulation 
begins with the procedural elements of a police-public interaction leading to individual-
level outcomes such as general cooperation, compliance, empowerment, and immediate 
and long-term police decision acceptance (see Figure 1). Except for the police performance 
and community policing models, the procedural fairness perspective focuses almost 
exclusively on individual experiences with police. 
[FIGURE 1] 
But if generating trust in police were only a function of changing police tactics, 
then the procedural fairness model would be sufficient to change individual perceptions of 
police trustworthiness and legitimacy. People can be influenced in their decision to trust 
by the aggregate behavior of their social reference group – in other words, by the presence 
of a social network effect. A social network effect is defined as “the propensity of an 
individual to behave in some way with the prevalence of that behaviour in some reference 
group containing that individual” (Manski 1993: 531). Previous research outside of 
criminal justice has uncovered the presence of a social network effect for wearing a 
particular fashion (e.g., Gladwell 2000), automobile ownership (e.g., Goetzke and 
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Weinberger 2012) and obesity (e.g., Christakis and Fowler 2007; Fowler and Christakis 
2008). Given the discovery of social network effects in such an array of different 
disciplines, it would not be a stretch to think that a social network effect for trust in police 
exists. 
It is worth noting that specific study of social network effects in the criminal justice 
literature is limited. Brunson and Weitzer (2011), in a set of in-depth interviews with long-
term residents in East and West St. Louis regarding whether, and if so how, citizens prepare 
for their contacts with officers before face-to-face encounters, point to the lack of network 
analysis in research explaining variation in perceptions of the police. They write: “Scholars 
are just beginning to study the role of vicarious influences, so this remains a significant 
gap in the literature on police-citizen relations. Indeed, most research continues to focus 
on individual-level factors rather than interpersonal influences on citizen perceptions of the 
police” (429). Their own study found that almost all the African American adults 
interviewed had transmitted to youth a “repertoire of ‘best practices’ in their contacts with 
officers” which were designed to reduce the chances of altercations and arrests of young 
people (ibid.: 449). Brunson and Weitzer further recommend that much more research 
should investigate the role reference group influences play in shaping attitudes toward the 
police (2011: 451). 
  A great number of studies have indicated that negative experiences with police 
officers and the criminal justice system are shared through family and friend networks or 
as a result of spatial proximity, though it should be noted that in these studies the authors 
were not explicitly looking for the presence of a social network effect: Feagin (1991) was 
exploring the effect of modern racial discrimination on middle class blacks; Brunson and 
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Miller (2006) and Brunson (2007) were looking at the experiences of African-American 
youth with law enforcement. For example, Feagin (1991) argues that in order to understand 
why individuals from different groups perceive discrimination differently it is important 
not only to consider the “cumulative character of an individual’s experiences with 
discrimination” but also “the group’s accumulated historical experiences as perceived by 
the individual” (114, emphasis added). Furthermore, Brunson and Miller (2006), 
performed in-depth interviews with 40 African American male and 35 African American 
female youth interviewees from St. Louis, Missouri, about their experiences and 
expectations for law enforcement. Over 90% of males and 85% of females indicated that 
they witnessed or knew someone who had been harassed or mistreated by the police, and 
describe in detail how other young men and women in their neighborhood are routinely 
treated by police, most of which involved police violence or other misconduct toward 
family and friends, which fostered anger and distrust toward the police. Moreover, Brunson 
(2007) in detailed interviews with 40 African American youth living in St. Louis city and 
county found that “[r]espondents offered detailed secondhand accounts of people being 
beaten by the police” and that most study participants “acknowledged that they had heard 
about many more instances of police violence than they had actually seen” (91). Brunson 
argues that regardless whether the secondhand accounts proved true, those accounts 
“reinforced study participants’ widespread beliefs about discriminatory policing practices” 
(2007: 92). Perhaps the most specific example of a social network effect is given by Dr. 
David J. Thomas, retired police officer and Senior Research Fellow at the National Police 
Foundation, in a blog post about the need for law enforcement to regain the public’s trust, 
when he writes: “The stories of the sheriff and the slave patrols play a part in the distrust 
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that the African American community has for law enforcement. These stories have been 
told for generations. As a child, I was told the stories by my father, who was born in 1914, 
and my grandfather, who was born in the late 1800s” (Thomas, n.d.).  
One interpretation of the consequences of the presence of a social network effect 
for trust in police is that police trust might be path dependent. Social network effects imply 
multiple equilibria, or, to put it another way, that there can be different outcomes 
(equilibria) for trust in police (e.g., trust/not trust). Some of the outcomes for a social 
network effect are dynamic (unstable) and others are static (stable). The dynamic (unstable) 
equilibria can be “tipped” toward one static (stable) outcome or another if a critical share 
of the social reference group adopts that outcome (Gladwell 2000: 12; Grodzins 1957; 
Schelling 1971); however, as Arthur warns: “There is no guarantee that the particular 
outcome selected from among the many alternatives will be the ‘best’ one” (Arthur 1994: 
1). The stable equilibria are the static path dependent outcomes which, owing to their 
stability, are very difficult to change and can persist over time. Path dependency thus 
represents a self-reinforcement mechanism in which each step along a given path makes 
continuing along that path easier while switching course becomes more costly (Arthur 
1994; Pierson 2000).  
The idea that static equilibria are “sticky” and resist direct efforts to change is 
similar to the sociological concept of collective memory. Collective memory refers to the 
“memory and representations of group pasts – whether these be ethnic, global, or other 
collective historical events” (Teeger 2014: 7). Bo Rothstein argues that collective 
memories are important to understanding an individual’s choice of strategy as they 
(collective memories) become a source of information regarding which individuals and 
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groups in society can be trusted.  Rothstein thinks that in some societies, low trust social 
traps -- scenarios in which people could be made better off if they choose to cooperate but 
do not because no one wants to be the first to change -- are the result of collective memory. 
He writes: “The problem of low interpersonal trust comes from discriminated groups 
having been forced to live under public political institutions that have been, or which they 
have believed to have been, deeply dysfunctional for them. The collective memory of 
things such as gross police brutality, public lynchings and systemic discrimination has a 
tremendous effect on the belief systems of which the individuals in a group such as this 
become the bearers” (Rothstein 2005: 127-128).  
In the context of police trust, social network effects (tipping points) and path 
dependency (collective memory) might explain the persistence of mistrust toward police 
found among African Americans and other minority groups in the United States. Historical 
police violence toward minority groups, housing segregation and Jim Crow undoubtedly 
had an impact on these group’s level of trust in police: the beginning of this paper 
referenced the perpetually low levels of trust and confidence in the police surveyed among 
African Americans but also that trust in police among Hispanics is also on the decrease; 
trust in the police for both groups has never broken the 50% point (Norman 2017). The 
idea that historical institutions can influence contemporary attitudes and behaviors is given 
support by the burgeoning literature on the persistent effect of historical institutions (for an 
overview, see: Nunn 2009). For example, Tankebe (2008; see also Tankebe 2009) traces 
contemporary police characteristics such as human rights violations, police corruption and 
police impunity to the operating organizational philosophy of former British colonial 
police. He points out that “[t]hese abuses have alienated the police even more from many 
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Ghanaians, which leads to significant distrust in the official mission of the police— 
‘service with integrity’” (Tankebe 2009: 1271). There are additional, non-police related 
examples as well: researchers have explored the link between historically high 
concentrations of slaves and persistent levels of inequality, weak institutions, violent and 
property crime in Colombia (Buonanno and Vargas 2016) and Brazil (Fujiwara, Laudares 
and Valencia C. 2019), a “Hapsburg effect” for government trust (Becker, Boeckh, Hainz 
and Woessmann 2011) and the location of historical lynchings, anti-Civil Rights 
Movement violence and contemporary voting behavior among African Americans 
(Peterson and Ward 2015).  
 
Extension. The question for police trust and legitimacy scholars is how to get out 
of a path dependent low police trust trap and “tip” a sufficient share of individuals toward 
trust in police. The procedural fairness perspective offers a conceptual model highlighting 
how individual interpersonal interactions between police and members of the public can 
lead to evaluations of procedural fairness, trustworthiness and legitimacy for police (e.g., 
Tyler 1990, 2003, 2005; Tyler and Huo 2002; Sunshine and Tyler 2003) and may be 
efficacious in dealing with the presence of social network effects (tipping points) and path 
dependency (collective memory), but because the model does not explicitly address them, 
they are unlikely to be factored into consideration of the police trust problem. Fortunately, 
Rothstein (2005, 2011) offers some guidance for overcoming collective memory and 
breaking out of a low trust social or procedural trap. His first suggestion pertains more 
specifically to battling corruption in institutions, but theoretically could work in any 
instance where some form of institutional path dependency exists, be that within police or 
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neighborhood institutions. Rothstein call this the indirect big bang approach to fighting 
corruption, the basic premise of which is that trying to deal with corruption in any 
institution incrementally and directly will probably fail because there are systems which 
underlie corruption which will resist explicit efforts to tinker with different parts of that 
system to try and eliminate that corruption (Rothstein 2011). What is needed is to combat 
corruption by getting the institution off balance, or, in other words, by addressing 
corruption in large-scale changes that moves too fast for institutional actors to adjust their 
tactics.  
Rothstein’s indirect big bang approach is clearly applicable to addressing the 
influence of social network effects and collective memories for trust in police. Collective 
memories cannot be rationally forgotten and attempts at altering perceptions of police 
trustworthiness and legitimacy incrementally leaves an overabundance of opportunities for 
the larger social network effect to counteract and return to the status quo (Rothstein 2005, 
2011). For example, an indirect big bang approach to dealing with the impact of a social 
network effect for trust in police might work with key neighborhood or community 
institutions on non-law enforcement related matters that challenge the narrative influence 
of collective memories in a large-scale and conspicuous manner, somewhat similarly to 
programmatic content in community policing but with the major difference that the point 
is to challenge the influence of collective memory. The idea here is that police can set the 
social network “off-balance” such that individual-level efforts at trust-building might be 
successful. The type of indirect big bang approach needed to unbalance the influence of a 
social network effect and collective memory might, following Rothstein, be to take as a 
guiding normative principle for the exercise of police authority the concept of 
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deontological impartiality (2011). Deontological (or universal) impartiality is critical to 
escaping low trust social or procedural traps because it shies away from partial, biased 
behavior on the part of institutional actors, which has been a recurrent concern among 
minority and vulnerable populations regarding police services (e.g., Brunson and Miller 
2006; Brunson 2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; Brunson and Weitzer 2011). 
Adopting a normative value like universal impartiality might serve to set both police 
institutions and the publics they serve off-balance in such a way that changing individual 
attitudes and behaviors through procedural fairness becomes possible. 
Conclusion 
From the review of literature, it is apparent that criminal justice thinking about trust 
in police has gone through several stages, with each stage building upon the lessons of the 
preceding one. The police performance model moved far away from the highly suspect 
image of the previous “political” era of policing toward a more hierarchical, centralized 
and professional police department whose strengths were to be controlling and deterring 
crime and force projection through the adoption of rapid response technology such as the 
patrol car and the wireless radio. Police trust was thus a function of police performance. 
The community policing philosophy shifted slightly away from the police performance 
model, insomuch as it recognized the importance of police-public relations to controlling 
and deterring crime and fear of crime, to a more decentralized organization where decision-
making authority was delegated down to street-level officers, according them greater 
discretion when deciding how to deal with the cases they encountered. Police trust was 
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here a function of social interaction and police performance. The procedural fairness 
perspective doubled-down on the social interaction aspect of community policing by 
concentrating attention on the behavior of police officers during police-public encounters, 
specifically on the quality of interpersonal treatment and the quality of decision-making, 
which lead to increased perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy. Under 
procedural fairness, police trust is a function of officer behavior in interactions.  
The critiques proposed in this paper follows this familiar theme. The first critique 
suggests that criminal justice thinking about trust in police more generally and procedural 
fairness more specifically need to be exercised within a normative framework to avoid 
falling into a low trust procedural trap. This is because the police performance and 
procedural fairness perspectives are essentially consequentialist in nature, which means 
that they can be used cynically to buffer police departments against public criticism of 
substantive organizational issues such as police accountability, responsiveness and 
corruption. The normative value proposed in this paper to guide the exercise of public 
authority is Bo Rothstein’s universal impartiality which holds that governments that 
exercise power in a universal, predictable and unbiased (impartial) manner will enjoy 
greater trust and legitimacy. Universal impartiality is deontological, meaning that it takes 
as its view of persons that they are ends in themselves and should never be treated as a 
means. Rothstein’s impartiality is also procedural, and so shares some similarity with the 
procedural fairness perspective, but rather than leaving the fairness of interactions to be 
evaluated subjectively, Rothstein’s impartiality becomes the measure of fairness. 
Impartiality does not replace the procedural fairness perspective’s process-based regulation 
model but rather extends it by grounding decisions about procedural fairness in the 
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normative framework of impartiality. Police trust therefore becomes a function of 
procedural fairness anchored in impartiality. The addition of impartiality to the process-
based model can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
 The second critique of criminal justice thinking about trust in police is the idea that 
individuals are influenced in their decision to trust not only by the behavior of police during 
social interactions but also vicariously through their social networks or peer reference 
groups. Excepting the police performance and community policing models, which took a 
blanket approach to changing perceptions of police trustworthiness, the procedural fairness 
perspectives both focus attention on individual perceptions to the exclusion of all other 
influences. This means that the procedural fairness model is not equipped to account for 
second-hand or vicarious information regarding police passed along through family and 
friend networks, which is problematic for these models as the work street-level officers do 
to improve perceptions of trust and legitimacy may be the policing equivalent to shuffling 
deck chairs on the Titanic: the non-trusting outcome will arrive regardless. Social network 
effects and their path dependent outcomes can be interpreted as the presence of collective 
memories. Collective memories include an individual’s cumulative experiences of police 
contact as well as the collective experience of being a member of a particular societal group 
as interpreted by them. For African Americans and other minority groups, their collective 
experiences of the police are filled with state-sanctioned violence, abuse of authority and 
corruption. One of the most poignant images of the African American experience with 
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police is the photo of Civil Rights marchers going through Selma, Alabama on their way 
to the statehouse to protest for their right to vote. On the other side of the Edmund Pettus 
bridge were a wall of police officers with night sticks, dogs and fire hoses – not to protect 
the marchers but to deter them. Rothstein argues that memories such as the one just 
described cannot be rationally forgotten and become part of an individual’s mental map 
which tells them who in society is trustworthy. Taking social network effects seriously in 
criminal justice means including them and their consequences in conceptual models 
accounting for the factors which influence trust in police. Figure 2 shows how collective 
memories might fit into the larger structure of individual decision-making as it pertains to 
trust in agents of the state in general and police in particular. 
In conclusion, it is possible to foresee a couple implications for policy of the 
expansion of this conceptual model. The first is that social network effects make switching 
course very difficult and costly, but not impossible. Thirty years ago, if you would have 
asked the average person what a conflict diamond was, they probably would not have 
known. A similar claim could be made about fair trade coffee. Today in 2019, by 
comparison, diamonds and coffee are expected to be conflict-free and fair trade. Changing 
perceptions of police trustworthiness and legitimacy will not happen overnight, but it can 
happen. But the presence of social network effects for trust in police makes change 
difficult. The procedural fairness perspective can use this to its advantage. Given that 
previous attempts at police reform have achieved mixed outcomes, it is not unreasonable 
to think there may be push-back to procedural fairness adoption across police forces. 
Linking the procedural fairness model to social network effects provides some impetus for 
skeptical police executives. Officers will be able, by their concerted actions, to have an 
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impact on levels of trust in local police through network diffusion. This provides another 
barometer for assessing the magnitude of a social network effect for trust in police, for 
example.  
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Figure 2.1. Tyler’s model of process-based regulation 
Source: (Tyler 2003: 284) 
Impartiality 
Collective memories 
 Group-level experiences as
perceived by individual
 Cumulative individual
experiences
Figure 2.2. Expanded model of process-based 
Adapted from: Tyler (2003: 284) 
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CHAPTER III 
TRUST IN POLICE: DOES UNIVERSAL IMPARTIALITY MATTER? 
Introduction 
Procedural fairness, on its own, is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
generate the type of broad-based trust and legitimacy highlighted by social scientists as 
essential to the effective operation of government more generally and policing in particular. 
A major reason, which forms the basis of the current paper, is that the procedural fairness 
argument is essentially consequentialist in that it focuses on the benefits to society of 
changing public compliance behavior with the law and legal authorities in the name of the 
greater good. While it is true that the means of reaching the kind of broad-based police 
trust and legitimacy is not entirely without consideration of how that trust and legitimacy 
is achieved, the ends of increased trust in police, improved perceptions of police legitimacy 
and greater compliance with the law are advanced as the true goal of police procedural 
fairness reform. What is required to achieve the broad-based trust and legitimacy in police 
is the adoption of a normative framework to guide the behavior of the organization, such 
as the impartiality as Quality of Government thesis, which argues that government 
institutions that wield public authority in a universal and impartial manner will enjoy 
greater trust and legitimacy because police tactics, such as those employed in procedural 
fairness perspective, are intrinsically valuable given that people are inherently valuable and 
deserve to be treated with dignity and respect.  
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Although the procedural fairness perspective uses the terms “fair” and “impartial” 
interchangeably, fair and impartial are not synonyms but rather denote two separate and 
distinct concepts: fairness is subjective, and impartiality is deontological. This 
deontological position generates trust because people expect that the police and other 
government agencies are reliably unbiased and non-discriminatory. The deontological 
ethical perspective of Immanuel Kant holds that the moral correctness of any action is 
determined by the Categorical Imperative which results in the view that people are ends in 
themselves to be treated with dignity and respect. What is missing is for this deontological 
position to be tested empirically along with procedural fairness and police performance as 
important predictors of trust in police. 
Thus, the main question for this paper is whether universal impartiality, in addition 
to the procedural fairness and police performance modalities, is a predictor of trust in 
police. Procedural fairness and police performance should both remain important 
predictors of trust, but universal impartiality will likely also contribute substantively to 
overall trust in police. Using European Social Survey data (Round 5), this paper aims to 
explore the tension between procedural fairness and impartiality as important predictors of 
trust in police. The value of this paper is twofold. First, it empirically evaluates the 
importance of predictors for trust in police in light of the arguments for police performance, 
procedural fairness and universal impartiality respectively, which has not, at the time of 
writing, been accomplished before. Second, it brings into conversation the steadily growing 
criminal justice literature on procedural fairness with the political philosophy of 
impartiality as Quality of Government. 
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The remainder of the article plays out as follows. The first part presents a review of 
literature linking police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality to trust 
in police. The second section describes the methods and data to be utilized in the analysis. 
Section three presents and interprets the results of the analysis and engages in a brief 
discussion of the implications of this paper for policy and thinking about generating trust 
in police. 
Trust in Police: What influences it? 
Police performance. Classic crime-control theory says that police performance 
predicts trust in police: the better police are at controlling crime, the more the public trust 
and support them (Tyler 2005; Kelling and Coles 1997; Wilson and Kelling 1982). The 
idea that trust in police and attributions of police legitimacy are based upon police 
performance goes back to the inception of the so-called “professional” model of policing 
in the 1930s which, owing much to the influence of Taylorism, cast police as crime-fighting 
experts, specialists in understanding and controlling the criminal impulses of the anti-social 
element of society (Greene 1987, 2000). The performance model of trust in police was 
dominant until the late 1960s/early 1970s when the legitimacy of the police was shaken by 
several events. First, presidential commission findings indicated that urban race riots were 
frequently sparked as much by police behavior as by that of the public (Greene 1987; Abu-
Lughod 2007). Second, anti-war Vietnam and civil rights protesters on college campuses 
challenged the legitimacy of police and National Guard orders to disperse by peacefully 
refusing to comply while being met with aggressive tactics on the part of both police and 
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National Guard members, sometimes to deadly consequences, as in the death of four 
student protesters at the Kent State University on May 4th, 1970 (Greene 2000). Third, 
studies of police foot patrol performance in high crime neighborhoods found that the fear 
of crime was divorced from actual crime rates, indicating that the perception of police 
presence and effectiveness was a more important predictor of trust in police and evaluations 
of their legitimacy than their actual performance (Moore and Trojanowicz 1988; Skogan 
1986; Trojanowicz 1986). Further, these failures of police tactics were televised to families 
across the nation, decreasing public sentiments toward police legitimacy, and, by 
extension, police’s claim to special knowledge regarding the maintenance of public order 
furthering (Greene 2000).  
However, the legitimacy of the police and other government agents partly rests on 
the perceived competence of these agents to carry out tasks which society perceives as 
responsibility of those agents. If police cannot control and prevent crime, which is 
frequently the public view of police’s function in society, what would be the point of the 
public cooperating them? If the public do not view the police as at least somewhat 
competent then they are not likely to trust them to do their jobs nor be willing to cooperate 
with them in the provision of public safety. An example of exactly this sentiment is 
captured by Brunson (2007) and Brunson and Weitzer (2009). Brunson (2007) interviewed 
40 African American males with ages ranging from 13 to 19 living in and around the St. 
Louis area about their experiences with and attitudes toward police – including trust -- 
using a mixture of initial survey questions which became prompts during in-depth 
qualitative interviews. The teens were routinely frustrated by slow response times for 
police, prioritization of calls for service and law enforcement’s inability to prevent and 
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solve crime (Brunson 2007: 81; see also Brunson and Miller 2006). When asked on the 
survey whether police did a good job preventing crime, 50% responded “Almost never”. 
In fact, one respondent discussed strategies for getting police to respond more quickly by 
lying to them about the nature of the crime in progress (Brunson 2007: 82). Further, 
Brunson and Weitzer (2009) interviewed white and black teens from three separate 
neighborhoods in St. Louis: one predominantly black, one predominantly white and one 
mixed neighborhood. Again, both black and white teens reported their perceptions that 
police services were better in white neighborhoods and that police in black neighborhoods 
would try to rush the handling of a call simply to be finished with it (Brunson and Weitzer 
2009: 875-876). The totality of these experiences left the African American teens shaken 
in their trust toward police while white teens had a more positive view of police. None of 
them trusted the complaint process, which required the teens to go to a police station house 
in order to file the complaint. The point being made here is that police performance, while 
not the sole determinant, is certainly a component of overall evaluations of trust in police. 
As such, police performance is thought to relate positively with trust in police. 
Procedural fairness. Tom Tyler’s procedural fairness (justice) policing perspective 
argues that procedural fairness predicts trust in police and improves perceptions of police 
legitimacy. This occurs because police act in a fair, respectful manner, explaining their 
decisions and permitting members of the public to explain their positions: if people witness 
these types of interactions or are subject to them, they infer that the organization is itself 
procedurally fair, and thus they have trust in it and support its policies vis a vis reporting 
crimes and such (Tyler 1990, 2003, 2005; Murphy and Tyler 2017; Hough, Jackson and 
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Bradford 2013; Tyler and Fagan 2008). The extent to which an interaction is deemed fair 
is based upon individual subjective perceptions of an interaction: there are no universal 
standards by which procedural fairness is measured (Tyler 2003). There are essentially two 
distinct axes along which individuals evaluate contact with police: quality of interpersonal 
treatment and quality of decision-making. Quality of interpersonal treatment involves, 
broadly, the extent to which officers treat those they have contact with dignity and respect, 
while the quality of decision-making concerns the extent to which officers explain their 
decisions, permit opportunities for input in problem-solving and neutrality. 
The empirical base for procedural fairness is robust, including studies beyond the 
original Anglo-American context to include studies in Ghana, Slovakia, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (Tankebe 2009; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012; 
Moravcová 2016). While scholars disagree regarding the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the procedural fairness concept itself (Gau 2011), a common finding is that, net 
of other influences, including police performance and distributive justice, procedural 
fairness is consistently the most important predictor of willingness to cooperate with police. 
However, much of the evidence favorable to procedural fairness has only explored the 
impact of different types of trust (e.g., trust in procedural fairness, trust in distributive 
fairness, etc.) on willingness to comply with the law and cooperate with police and has 
used trust as an explanatory variable rather than as an outcome variable (see: Tyler 2005; 
Jackson, Hough, Bradford Hohl and Kuha 2012; Hough et al. 2013; Moravcová 2016; 
Barnes, Beaulieu and Saxton 2017). Among those, only Jackson, et al. (2012), Hough et 
al. (2013) and Moravcová (2016) have used ESS Round 5 data. For example, Hough et al. 
(2013), who also use the same ESS Round 5 data employed by this article, examine various 
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hypotheses related to an “empirical” view of legitimacy versus Bottoms and Tankebe’s 
(2012) dialogic view of legitimacy. They use different kinds of trust in police (trust in 
police procedural fairness, for example) to see how well those types of trust predict self-
reported compliance behaviors in the UK. Hough et al. (2013) demonstrate that trust in 
police procedural fairness is the most important predictor of willingness to comply with 
the law. Tyler (2005) similarly looked at the predictive power of trust in police for 
complying with the law as well as the relationship between police policies and trust in 
police. He found that trust in police was significant for complying with the law and that 
fairness of procedures was the most important predictor of trust in police.  
 
Universal impartiality. Since the writings of Max Weber, the public administration 
and governance literature has had an interest in impartiality and legitimacy. Both Bo 
Rothstein and Tom Tyler discuss trust in police and the attainment of political legitimacy. 
For Tyler, the answer is simply procedural fairness. Rothstein’s Quality of Government as 
impartiality thesis, on the other hand, says that trust in the police and legitimacy of 
government – high Quality of Government – comes from exercising public authority in a 
universal and impartial way (Rothstein 2005; 2011; Rothstein and Teorell 2008a, 2008b).  
Unlike most of the criminal justice contributions, the argument presented in this 
paper is lent support for the idea that normative values guiding the use of procedural 
fairness from within the discipline by Justice Tankebe (2009; see also: Bottoms and 
Tankebe 2012). Tankebe’s (2009) critique of the procedural fairness (Tylerian) perspective 
is important for two reasons. First, similar to the position taken by this paper, he argues 
that that procedural fairness, police trust and legitimacy are, over and above considerations 
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for the “greater good” of increased law-abiding behavior, intrinsically valuable and should 
be pursued as such, regardless of the instrumental or utilitarian benefits those concepts may 
provide. Tankebe writes: “[t]he police have an intrinsic and non-negotiable obligation to 
exercise their authority within the limitations of normative values and expectations of the 
particular society in question, irrespective of any demonstrable instrumental benefits in 
terms of facilitation of police’s task in maintaining order” (2009: 14). However, while 
universal impartiality is here argued to be the normative value by which public authority 
is exercised, Tankebe stops short of providing any guidance as to which normative values 
are important.  
Second, Tankebe argues for the importance of outcomes to individuals, despite the 
downplaying of outcomes in subjective assessments of police argued by Tyler. Tankebe 
contends that, while fair procedure might be important and mitigate perceptions of 
unfavorable outcomes, it cannot nullify the impact of unfair outcomes. People who 
regularly receive unfair outcomes are “likely to see the procedure as a sham, orchestrated 
to make them feel good when indeed it has no bearing on the outcome” (2009: 14). Without 
normative guidance in implementing policy and procedure, Tankebe notes that it is possible 
to be led into a “procedural trap” in which “legal and political authorities tend to focus 
attention on procedural justice in order to deflect attention away from more substantive 
issues” (ibid.). Impartiality in this sense is a guiding normative principle; it helps to avoid 
a “mindless utilitarianism” in public policy in which “basic human rights of (often poor) 
people are sacrificed in the name of some overall utility” (Rothstein 2011: 6). This is 
essentially Rothstein’s critique of the “good governance” approach taken in recent decades 
by political philosophy, public administration, criminal justice and financial entities such 
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as the World Bank: political legitimacy and trust cannot rest on procedures or the input 
side of a political system alone.  
Rothstein does not deny that subjective perceptions of procedural fairness are 
important to government’s ability to attain political legitimacy. In his discussion of the 
events leading up to the Yugoslavian civil war, he makes the following point: Political 
legitimacy depends more on the output side of a political system than the input side, 
meaning the exercise of public authority is more important than access to input (voting) or 
following the “will of the people” for gaining legitimacy. Rothstein continues: “As such, 
it [legitimacy] is connected to citizens’ perceptions about procedural fairness in the 
implementation of public policies” (2011: 91). What is interesting about these lines is that 
Rothstein follows them in the next paragraph by saying “a state that systematically departs 
from the ideal of impartiality in implementing public policy will be seen as illegitimate” 
(2011: 92). Essentially, Rothstein’s position is that, yes, subjective perceptions of 
procedural fairness are important to police and governments for attaining improved 
perceptions of legitimacy. But the norm by which individuals will evaluate the “fairness” 
of the procedure is by the universal and impartial nature of the implementation of that 
policy, not by some parochial concern with fairness as it applies to the individual.  
The fact that both Tyler and Rothstein interchange fairness and impartiality 
regularly is problematic. Impartiality in the exercise of public authority may to some still 
sound very similar to Tyler’s procedural fairness argument, but it is different in two 
important ways. First, fairness and impartiality are not synonyms. Universal impartiality is 
an absolute: it applies to everyone (universal) and people are either regarded impartially 
(that is, reliably and without bias) or they are not; there is no middle ground. Rather, 
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impartiality is expected and is the value by which evaluations of fairness are to be made. 
Tyler’s fairness, by contrast, deals with subjective perceptions and interpretations and thus 
can vary depending upon the individual doing the evaluating. An action may be deemed 
fair by an individual yet the act itself not be impartial. An individual may favor aggressive 
police tactics against suspects from certain backgrounds but not others and view the use of 
these tactics as fair, but such actions would violate the principle of universal impartiality 
because those tactics do not apply to everyone, nor is sanction for such bias inscribed in 
the law. Fairness is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for impartiality. While it 
is possible to say that all which is impartial is fair, it is not possible to state that all that is 
fair is impartial.  
Second, the procedural aspect of procedural fairness does not seem to apply to the 
exercise of public authority but rather to the posture taken by agents of the state when 
interacting with the public. “Fair procedure” has less to do with substantive criminal 
procedures, such as offering a Miranda warning4, having the effective assistance of counsel 
at trial, prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, etc. Instead, fair procedure describes 
how police should treat individuals and is entirely dependent upon the perceptions of the 
subject of those interpersonal “procedures”. Impartiality, by contrast, would be applied to 
4 The Miranda warning (often shortened to "Miranda", or "Mirandizing" a suspect is the name of the formal 
warning that is required to be given by law enforcement in the United States to criminal suspects in police 
custody (or in a custodial situation) before they are interrogated, in accordance with the Miranda ruling. The 
purpose of such is to ensure the accused are aware of, and reminded of, these rights before questioning or 
actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (U.S. Constitution Article 1 Section 8 
Article 5). 
Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark case in the United States Supreme Court. 
The Court held that both inculpatory and exculpatory statements made in response to interrogation by a 
defendant in police custody will be admissible at trial only if the prosecution can show that the defendant 
was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning and of the right against 
self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but 
voluntarily waived them. 
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substantive criminal procedure (all suspects are offered a Miranda warning, all suspects 
have the right of effective assistance of counsel at trial, all suspects should receive 
reasonable and humane punishments) as well as to the manner in which agents of the state 
interact with members of the public (all persons are to be treated with dignity and respect, 
all persons deserve to understand what is happening to them). The legitimacy of the state 
cannot rest solely on the interactive modality of government agents when they have contact 
with members of the public; it must be substantive and apply not only to how the public 
are treated but also to how law is implemented and evaluated.  
A great example of this come from Jacinta Gau’s (2013) study of the effects of 
requests by police for consent searches of cars on driver’s perceptions of stop legitimacy 
(see also: Gau and Brunson 2012; Epp, Maynard-Moody and Haider-Markel 2014). Using 
a nationally representative sample of adults and teenagers in the U.S. from the 2008 Police-
Public Contact Survey, Gau (2013) found that consent searches in traffic stops – searches 
in which officers requested consent to search a stopped vehicle – in contrast to traffic 
violation stops, decreased the trust and legitimacy perceptions of the stop by the driver 
despite procedural fairness being employed by the officer (see also: Engel 2005). She 
concluded that in consent searches, because pulling the driver over for an alleged traffic 
violation was a pretext to get consent to search the car, the consent request indicated to the 
driver that the officer was not being impartial. In other words, because the request was 
made on the suspicion that they (the drivers) had possibly committed a crime, the impartial 
reason (traffic violation) for the stop became partial (pretext to search), and the presence 
of procedural fairness in the stop became irrelevant. Gau’s study provides further reason 
to suspect that procedural fairness alone is not sufficient to gain the type of broad-based 
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trust and legitimacy in police that the Tylerian procedural fairness perspective claims, but 
it is consistent with the main argument of this paper, as well as Rothstein’s argument, that 
impartiality as a basic norm of the exercise of public authority is an important factor 
predicting trust in police.  
One final point of difference involves the conceptualization of distributive justice 
and universal impartiality. An objection could be raised that Rothstein’s impartiality is 
essentially Tyler’s distributive justice. But there is an important way in which these 
conceptualizations differ. Impartiality, as a deontological normative value, is not 
concerned with subjective perceptions of police service distribution. Rather, impartiality 
in the exercise of public authority is an absolute, unqualified rule which should be followed 
regardless of fairness considerations as to the distribution of services. A social welfare 
program impartially implemented would provide security for all citizens regardless of 
wealth, but need is not distributed equally: such a system would provide more services for 
those with greater need for those services (Rothstein 2011: 24). Tyler’s distributive justice, 
on the other hand, refers to it (distributive justice) as an instrumental motivation for 
cooperating with authorities focused on “the fairness of outcomes” (2011: 42; see also 
Tyler 2003, 2005) or whether “the police fairly distribute police services, providing ‘equal 
protection for all’” (2011: 69). The major difference is that, under Tyler’s conception of 
distributive justice, fairness of police service distribution deals with equality of service 
while Rothstein’s impartiality holds that police services should be distributed impartially 
but with reference to those with greatest need.  
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In summary, the idea that the context of a universal, structural impartiality is, in 
addition to perceptions of police performance and procedural fairness, an important factor 
influencing public trust in and legitimacy for the police is not necessarily a new idea but 
one that has not been examined in this way. This essay addresses an often-overlooked 
dimension of procedural justice policing using data from the ESS Round 5 ‘trust in justice’ 
module, namely, what other factors besides performance and procedural fairness influence 
trust in police. The next section explains the data and methods for this study. 
 
 
Data, Model and Variables 
 
Data. Data for this study are taken from the European Social Survey (ESS) Round 
5. The ESS is a biennial cross-national survey established in 2001 covering topics ranging 
from politics, human values, democracy and health inequalities. The ESS uses cross-
sectional probability samples representative of all persons at least 15 years of age or older 
who live within private households in each country. Since its inception, 37 countries have 
participated in at least one round of the ESS.  
The current Round 5 of the ESS, conducted in 2010, included a new module 
specifically developed for this round entitled Justice. It investigates public trust in criminal 
justice with particular emphasis on police and the courts (ESS Round 5 2018). The aim of 
this module was to capture individual-level perceptions of trust, legitimacy, cooperation 
and compliance, and it did this specifically by asking questions measuring confidence in 
the police and the courts, cooperation with the police and courts, contact with police and 
attitudes towards punishment (ibid.). There is currently no publicly available data set which 
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taps into public attitudes toward police as this one does. As discussed previously, Hough 
et al. (2013) have also used this data set to explore the antecedents of police legitimacy, 
but whereas Hough et al. (2013) uses only data for the UK, this paper makes use of the 
individual-level responses for each country in the dataset. Given that the current study is 
interested in exploring factors thought to influence trust in police, the ESS Round 5 is ideal. 
Model. The model proposed in this paper is novel in the procedural fairness 
literature as it makes individual-level trust in police the outcome variable of interest rather 
than as a predictor of legitimacy. The model selected to investigate this question is a 
structural equation model (SEM). SEM allows for the analysis of covariances or means in 
experimental and non-experimental research designs (Kline 2016). This model has three 
distinct advantages over traditional regression models. First, SEM can distinguish between 
latent and observed variables, with multiple indicators possible for each latent construct 
(Acock 2013; Kline 2016). Concepts such as police performance, procedural justice and 
universal impartiality are better modeled as latent constructs than through individual 
variables. Second, whereas traditional regression models assume no error in indicators, 
SEM isolates measurement error from indicator variables to latent variables, thus granting 
stronger predictive power as random measurement error does not have explanatory power 
(Acock 2013: 113). Third, a traditional regression model would likely require the 
construction of an index or composite variable in order to more accurately model latent 
constructs, which potentially introduces more measurement error into the model. Indices 
have two major disadvantages compared to latent constructs. First, creating an index, 
unlike creating a measurement model, does not permit each response scale to vary freely, 
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potentially compounding measurement error. Second, using indices assumes that each 
observed variable in the index is weighted equally, whereas measurement models permit 
observed variables to make their own relative weights through their coefficients. As a result 
of these issues, SEM is a more appropriate choice of model than a traditional regression 
for this study.  
The full structural equation model can be seen in Figure 1. It consists of a structural 
model predicting respondents’ trust in police with three major policy variables and four 
controls. The three major policy variables are constructed as measurement models for 
police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality. The measurement 
model for each composed of three observed variables, which will be discussed below in 
greater detail. Four additional control variables thought to potentially influence trust in 
police, gender, the log of age and two education levels were included as well. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable for this study is individual-level trust 
in police. The ESS round 5 module ‘Justice’ asked respondents how much they personally 
trust the institution of the police using an 11-point scale with higher scores indicating more 
trust in police (0 = no trust at all; 10 = complete trust). This variable directly addresses the 
main question of this study: whether, in addition to procedural justice policing and police 
performance, the basic norm of universal impartiality has an impact on trust in police. The 
descriptive statistics for these and all other variables in the analysis are located in Table 1, 
below. 
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[TABLE 1] 
Measurement Models. The primary measurement models in this analysis are latent 
constructs for police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality. Each has 
been argued to theoretically and/or empirically influence trust in police in the procedural 
justice literature.  
The first measurement model is police performance. The idea that trust in police is 
related to police performance and output effectiveness comes from the traditional crime-
control and deterrence approach to policing. The crime-control model of policing proposes 
that “if the police are successful in fighting crime, they [the police] encourage public trust 
and confidence and generally gain the help and support of the public for the police” (Tyler 
2005: 325). In other words, the better the public perception that police are controlling and 
preventing crime, the more public trust they receive (Kelling and Coles 1996; Wilson and 
Kelling 1982). The ESS Round 5 contains three variables that gauge the extent to which 
the public view their police as effective in preventing and controlling crime: How quickly 
police arrive at a violent crime scene near to where respondent lives (police responsiveness: 
0 = extremely slowly; 10 = extremely quickly), how successful police are at preventing 
crimes in country (violent crime prevention: 0 = extremely unsuccessful; 1 = extremely 
successful) and how successful police are at catching house burglars in country (burglary 
prevention: 0 = extremely unsuccessful; 1 = extremely successful). Each of these variables 
is hypothesized to relate positively to police performance. 
58 
The second measurement model is procedural fairness. Tyler’s procedural fairness 
argument is that people who perceive police to have treated them fairly and with respect in 
their dealings will be more likely to trust police and to infer the trustworthiness of other 
police officers (2005; Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler and Lind 1992). In other words, 
perceptions of procedural fairness are antecedents of trust in police. There are two key 
aspects to citizen evaluations: quality of interpersonal treatment, which includes process 
transparency and respective the dignity and acknowledging the rights, and quality of 
decision-making, which includes police explaining their decisions (understandable actions) 
and the perceived fairness of the process (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2003, 2005). 
The principles of quality of treatment, decision-making and understandable actions are 
captured by survey variables asking respondents how often police make fair, impartial 
decisions in the cases they deal with (fair treatment: 1 = not at all; 4 = very often), how 
often police treat people in their country with respect (respect citizens: 1 = not at all often; 
4 = very often) and how often police explain decisions when asked (explain decisions: 1 = 
not at all often; 4 = very often). Each of these variables is hypothesized to relate positively 
to procedural justice.  
The third and final latent construct is universal impartiality. Rothstein’s 
impartiality is concerned with universal application, regardless of socio-economic status 
or racial/ethnic or gender identity, victim or offender status, an absence of corruption (be 
it police, court or other administrative apparatus) and the absence of undue political 
pressure on police by politicians or public opinion. Universal impartiality should relate 
positively to trust in police. Three questions created using variables from the ESS Round 
5 capture these points succinctly. The first item was created from a question which asked 
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respondents’ perceptions of the extent to which rich and poor victims are treated the same. 
The second response (rich and poor are treated equally) is the basis for the creation of 
(treat wealth equal: 0 = no; 1 = yes). The third item (incorruptible) was created from the 
never category of variable (plccbrb) asking how often police in the respondent’s country 
never take bribes (incorruptible: 0 = no; 1 = yes). The third and final item (political 
pressure) was created from the disagree strongly category of variable (plciplt) which asked 
the extent to which a country’s police are unduly influenced by politicians or political 
pressure (political pressure: 0 = no; 1 = yes). Each item is hypothesized to relate positively 
to impartiality.  
An question which asked respondents whether police in their country treat cases 
they deal with fairly and impartially (fair treatment: 1 = not at all; 4 = very often) was 
considered and rejected as a predictor of impartiality because, as has been previously 
discussed, fairness and impartiality are not synonyms, despite them being used 
interchangeably by both Rothstein and Tyler. Impartiality as a universal idea is categorical 
and cannot, by definition, be a matter of degrees, while the fair treatment variable is a 
measure of degree and is not categorical. Because it is a measure of degree rather than an 
absolute, it is likely that fair treatment was understood by respondents as referring to 
fairness rathe than impartiality. Thus, while fair treatment may not fit well into the 
impartiality measurement model, it does do well to capture the subjective and graduated 
fairness dimension of the procedural fairness policing measurement model.  
Control Variables. Four variables were added to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the population. These include an item for gender (Female: 0 = Male; 1 = 
Female), education level, divided into individuals with less than the secondary level of 
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education (Less Than HS: 0 = No; 1 = Yes) and those with a tertiary education or higher 
(Academic Degree: 0 = No; 1 = Yes). An age variable (lnage) was also included and logged. 
The theory presented in this paper does not provide guidance for the impact of these control 
variables on trust in police, but it is expected that female, age and higher levels of education 
relate positively with trust in police while lower levels of education relates negatively with 
trust in police. This is because females are more likely to be victimized and less likely to 
be offenders and therefore have a more trusting view of police. Age and education follow 
similar paths: adolescents are more likely to have run-ins with law enforcement while as 
people age, they tend to support and trust the police more; and, as educational attainment 
increases, so too does support for the role of legal institutions in maintaining public order. 
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
 
The main finding of the structural model of this study – that universal impartiality 
is an important predictor of trust in police alongside police performance and procedural 
fairness policing – is empirically supported. In Model 1, the effects of police performance, 
procedural fairness and impartiality were analyzed as well as several control variables such 
as age (logged), gender and education level to assess the joint impact of all three constructs 
simultaneously on trust in police. As can be seen in Table 2, in the structural models, the 
main policy variable for this study, universal impartiality, as well as procedural fairness 
and police performance were all highly significant predictors of trust in police; that is, 
when people perceive police as being non-discriminatory, uncorrupted and free of undue 
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political influence, in addition to perceived fair and respectful police treatment, they are 
more likely to trust the police. This is consistent with previous research which has found 
that procedural justice is an antecedent to trust in police. However, unlike previous models 
of procedural justice, police performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality 
are predictors of trust in police, not of perceptions of legitimacy. Among the control 
variables, only education at the bachelor’s level or above was a significant predictor. The 
measurement model, seen in Table 3, indicates that all observed variables have the correct 
sign and significance in relation to their latent constructs. 
 [TABLE 3] 
Model fit statistics indicate a good model fit. There are a plethora of model fit 
indices available, but at a minimum analysts tend to report the comparative fit index (CFI), 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI, also Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI)), and the root mean squared 
error of approximation (RMSEA) (Schreiber, Stage, King, Nora and Barlow 2006). The 
CFI adjusts issues with sample size found in several fit tests (i.e., chi-square, normed fit) 
and measures the discrepancy between the data and the hypothesized model (Gatignon 
2011; Hu and Bentler 1999). A model is considered to have a “good” fit if the CFI is greater 
than or equal to 0.95. The CFI for both models is 0.983 and 0.973, respectively, indicating 
that this model is a good fit. The TLI compares the chi-squared value of the null model to 
the chi-squared test of the hypothesized model, correcting for negative bias. A TLI value 
greater than or equal to 0.95 is considered a good model fit. The TLI for both models 0.977 
and 0.965, respectively. Finally, the RMSEA measures the discrepancy between the 
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population covariance matrix and the hypothesized model (with optimally chosen 
parameters) (Hooper, Coughlan and Mullen 2008). RMSEAs less than 0.8 indicate a good 
fit; the RMSEA for both models is 0.027. The overall R-squared for Model 1 is 0.97. 
Several robustness checks were performed on the data to confirm the results. The 
first robustness check was to estimate the model using maximum likelihood (ML), quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML), maximum likelihood missing values (MLMV) and 
asymptotic distribution free (ADF). The maximum likelihood family of estimators is 
sensitive to multivariate non-normality, but can be relaxed, provided the analyst recognizes 
that the standard error of the variance could be large. The result of running the main model 
with each estimator was that signs and significance for regression coefficients remained 
comparable, indicating that the findings reported here are robust. The estimator reported 
for this SEM model is a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator. Other estimator methods 
have certain advantages, for example, asymptotic distribution free (ADF) and quasi-
maximum likelihood (QML or robust ML) deal with issues of heteroskedasticity, while 
maximum likelihood missing values (MLMV) can produce reliable estimates in the face of 
missing data. Approximately 36% of the observations in this model were missing on the 
dependent variable (trust in police). However, after testing each estimator separately on 
the main model, the same signs and significance for each measurement model were noted, 
indicating that the ML estimator was sufficient.  
The second robustness check was performed by dividing up the data into three 
different groups with different sets of institutions: former socialist, Protestant and non-
Protestant countries. Model 2 samples former socialist-bloc countries: Russian Federation, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
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Hungary. Model 3 looks only at majority Protestant countries: Switzerland, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. Model 4 samples 
majority non-Protestant countries: France, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland, Israel 
and Belgium. This check was to ensure that the results were not driven by specific 
institutional traditions. Models 2 through 4, which tested the main hypothesis across a 
subsample of former socialist, current Protestant and non-Protestant countries for 
robustness, found that universal impartiality and procedural fairness remained highly 
significant predictors of trust in police. Consistent with previous research, police 
performance was also found to be significant predictor of trust in police; that is, when 
people perceived the police as being successful and competent at controlling crime, they 
were more likely to trust the police. As can be seen in Table 2, the signs and significance 
of the impact of the measurement models on trust in police are analogous, meaning that no 
one country or set of countries nor institutional arrangements drive the significant result in 
Model 1. However, in the subsamples the effect of universal impartiality and procedural 
fairness were diminished somewhat while police performance became more prominent. 
This diminution may suggest that both universal impartiality and procedural fairness are 
incorporated in perceptions of police performance, meaning that they may not be an 
“either/or” but instead a “both/and”. This check also shows that impartiality, at least within 
the European context, is universal: it is a positive and highly significant indicator for trust 
in police across national and institutional contexts, even though the significance of both 
impartiality and procedural fairness diminishes across models.  
The findings presented in this study are important for criminal justice thinking and 
policy. The first implication is that while the search for police trust and legitimacy certainly 
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has a performance and procedural aspect, the normative context in which performance and 
procedure are deployed matters to individuals when making the decision to trust in police. 
In so doing, procedural fairness and impartiality are cast in a new light: police and legal 
authorities can deploy them and probably net “good” (read: providing self-regarding 
benefits) outcomes, but this is not the reason why they should be used. Instead, the fact that 
the ESS Round 5 captures these subjective perceptions is important because it indicates 
what individuals are looking for in their social contract. Impartiality is not an essential 
universal truth discovered through these models, but rather it is a social preference for a 
universal rule that people would like to have written into their social contracts in these 
societies, at least in the European context. Although the United States was not included in 
this dataset, the fact that Western European countries in the liberal tradition support 
impartiality suggests that the U.S., which also prizes classical liberalism, might, too. It is 
thus worth considering how the police procedures and tactics would be articulated under 
the rubric of universal impartiality. 
Conclusion 
The findings reported in this study support the idea that the normative value of 
universal impartiality is an important contextual component for understanding public trust 
in police.  
The value of this paper is that it connects and builds upon Tyler’s and Rothstein’s 
theoretical and empirical work on procedural fairness and Quality of Government. Tyler’s 
procedural fairness takes a normative consequentialist position on legitimacy. The Tylerian 
position holds that procedural fairness is an antecedent to trust in police and that trust in 
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police can lead to an increase in perceived legitimacy for the police and compliance and 
cooperation with the law. However, Tyler’s fairness is subjective, based upon individual 
perceptions, and not universal, which means that the procedural justice perspective leaves 
open the question of what the substantive content of laws ought to be and which laws ought 
to be followed to political philosophy (Tyler 2003).  
Rothstein’s approach, by contrast, is universal and deontological. The Rothsteinian 
perspective on Quality of Government is that public authority should be exercised 
impartially and in a procedurally fair manner. However, for Rothstein, procedural fairness 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for impartiality because without an overarching 
value to guide the creation and implementation of public policy it is entirely possible that 
biased laws could be created and administered in a procedurally fair manner (Tankebe 
2007; Gau 2013; Rothstein 2011) that would not be impartial. Rothstein, therefore, shifts 
further than Tyler, arguing that the normative context in which procedural fairness is 
employed is an important factor predicting not only trust in police but trust and legitimacy 
in government as well.  However, Rothstein uses the terms fairness and impartiality 
interchangeably, which complicates efforts to disentangle conceptually whether he means 
subjective fairness or universal impartiality. 
In considering the findings presented in this study, it is important to recognize three 
substantial limitations. The first issue is that data presented here are cross-sectional, 
limiting the scope for inferring causal relationships. Ideal data regarding police 
performance, procedural fairness and universal impartiality would be a longitudinal panel 
to better analyze their impact on perceptions over time. Perceptions of impartiality are not 
likely to change in the short term because of a new, more partial political and policing 
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regime. A society whose public expect universal impartiality will not throw that norm away 
even if the entire government behaves partially toward groups in society. However, the 
same cannot be readily said of procedural justice policing or police performance, 
particularly in places where universal impartiality is perceived to be low. Having data 
measured at regular intervals might help disentangle, for example, whether there is a 
causative relationship between police performance, procedural fairness and universal 
impartiality or whether past events – such as an historical trend of corruption in a country 
(collective memory), for example – creates multiple equilibria and leads to path dependent 
outcomes (Rothstein 2005; Charon and LaPuente 2011).  
The second limitation is that it could be the case that individuals have a difficult 
time separating between procedural fairness and impartiality, creating a data measurement 
limitation. Indeed, fairness and impartiality are not equivalent concepts despite sharing 
some scope and reach in common. Even though the ESS Round 5 data set provides access 
to an array of individual perceptions regarding the police and the courts that is unsurpassed 
in its richness, questions such as that for fair treatment (“In the cases they deal with, do 
police treat victims in a fair and impartial manner?”) conflate the two concepts, making 
them analytically difficult to parse out, and thus having an impact on the level of certainty 
that can be carried by the conclusions presented here. The final issue is that, to date, a data 
set does not exist to test the main hypothesis of this paper within the American context. 
While the argument has been made above that Americans would follow their Western 
European counterparts in upholding the norm of impartiality, such a discussion is 
speculative at best. Future research on police performance, procedural fairness and 
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universal impartiality should focus on additional countries not included in the current 
analysis. 
In conclusion, the main argument of this paper has been that universal impartiality, 
in addition to procedural fairness and police performance, is a significant predictor for trust 
in police. The empirical analysis supported this hypothesis. The significance of this paper 
is that it puts into conversation two scholars whose work has previously not been 
conversant with one another to present a model of trust in police that deepens the 
conceptual nuance of this most important issue. 
 Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of model variables 
Variable Name Description Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
trustpolice Trust in police 0 10 5.666 2.688 
female Gender (female) 0 1 0.512 0.499 
ln(age) Natural log of age in years 2.639 4.615 3.758 0.432 
lessthanhs Less than secondary education 0 1 0.279 0.449 
bachorbet Greater than or equal bachelor’s degree 0 1 0.214 0.411 
Impartiality 
 politicalpress Are police unduly influenced by political pressure? 0 1 0.189 0.391 
 treatwealth Do police treat rich and poor victims of crimes equally? 0 1 0.474 0.499 
 incorruptible Police do not take bribes 0 1 0.080 0.272 
Procedural Justice 
 treatfair Do police treat cases fairly and impartially? 1 4 2.732 0.672 
 explaindecision Do police explain decisions?  0 4 2.499 0.857 
 respectcitizen Do police treat people with respect? 1 4 2.781 0.702 
Police Performance 
 preventviolcrime How well do police prevent violent crime? 0 10 5.109 2.048 
 preventburgl How well do police prevent burglary? 0 10 4.675 2.173 
 responsiveness How quickly do police respond to violent crime in your area? 0 10 5.645 2.287 
N=33,779 
Source: European Social Survey, Round 5 (2010) 
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Figure 3.1. – Impact of police performance, procedural justice and universal impartiality on police trust 
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 Table 3.2: Structural model estimating the impact of police performance, procedural fairness and impartiality on police trust 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
All Data Former Socialist Protestant Non-Protestant 
N 33,779 11,426 11,585 10,182 
Partial R2 0.475 0.396 0.407 0.443 
Impartiality 0.317*** 0.281*** 0.227*** 0.188*** 
(0.015) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) 
Procedural Justice 0.240*** 0.151*** 0.230*** 0.256*** 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Police Performance 0.229*** 0.283*** 0.297*** 0.315*** 
(0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
female -0.001 0.011 0.007 0.018** 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
(ln)age -0.006 -0.038*** 0.005 0.013 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
lessthanhs 0.003 0.010 -0.039*** -0.025** 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
bachorbet 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.060*** 0.011 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
***p<0.01  **p < 0.05 *p<0.1 
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 Table 3.3: Measurement models and model fit for Model (1) 
N 33,779 
Adjusted R2 0.970 
RMSEA 0.035 
CFI 0.973 
TLI 0.965 
SRMR 0.026 
Coefficien
t Std. Dev. 
Impartiality 
 politicalpress 0.261*** 0.007 
 treatwealth 0.591*** 0.007 
 incorruptible 0.310*** 0.006 
Procedural Justice 
 policefairimp 0.804*** 0.003 
 policeexplaindec 0.618*** 0.004 
 policerespect 0.800*** 0.003 
Police Performance 
 preventviolcrime 0.840*** 0.003 
 preventburgl 0.772*** 0.003 
 policeresponse 0.613*** 0.004 
***p<0.01  **p < 0.05 *p<0.1 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRUST IN POLICE: THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL NETWORK EFFECTS AND 
PATH DEPENDENCY 
Introduction 
An important consideration in accounting for variations in trust in police is the role 
of social network effects and collective memory. Contemporary methods of increasing 
perceptions of trust and legitimacy toward police, like community policing and procedural 
fairness, look at the decision to trust police as most directly influenced by present positive 
police-public social interactions from which individuals infer the trustworthiness and 
legitimacy of police institutions. The community policing philosophy, for example, looks 
to the frequency of police-public contacts and the level of citizen involvement in problem-
solving as the main methods for gaining public trust in police (Trojanowicz, Kappeler, 
Gaines and Bucqueroux 1998; Greene 2000; Gill, et al. 2014). The procedural fairness 
position holds that the quality of treatment in interpersonal contact is the mechanism by 
which individual perceptions of police trust are increased, leading transitively to 
heightened perceptions of institutional trustworthiness and legitimacy (Tyler 1990, 2003, 
2005; Sunshine and Tyler 2003). The empirical record for community policing and 
procedural fairness seem to support these claims, yet variation remains in individual-level 
perceptions of trust in police (e.g., Tankebe 2009b; Reisig, Tankebe and Meško 2012; 
Moravcová 2016; Gill, et al. 2014). 
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In addition to concerns about the quality and frequency of police-public contact, 
another important factor influencing trust in police is that individual decisions to trust are 
influenced by the behavior of family members, friends and neighbors whose accumulated 
experiences and perceptions of police are collectively shared and passed along to 
subsequent generations, potentially leading to a path dependency for trust in police from 
which reversing course may be impossible. The implications of the existence of a social 
network effect for trust in police means taking seriously the impacts of previous contact 
with police represented through peer group influence and collective memories on 
individual behavior. It may not be sufficient, for example, for a single procedurally fair 
police-public interaction to overcome the collective memory of current peer group and past 
police antagonism influence to change individual perceptions of police trustworthiness and 
legitimacy.  
Thus, the main question for this paper is whether a social network effect for trust 
in police exists. If it does, it is further argued that collective memory is one consequence 
of social network effects. Combining the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, the U.S. 
Decennial Census, the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics series 
and the F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report data, this paper aims to explore the impact of social 
network effects on trust in police. The value of this paper is threefold. First, it empirically 
and quantitatively tests for the existence of a social network effect for trust in police which, 
as of the date of writing, has not been studied previously in the criminal justice literature. 
Second, it brings together the concepts of social network effects and collective memory in 
the context of police trust. Third, it makes relevant for criminal justice the theory of 
collective memory, underscoring the importance of an individual’s historical mental maps 
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and his/her contemporary attitudes, beliefs and behaviors which is germane to 
understanding the difficulty inherent in changing perceptions of police trustworthiness 
incrementally. 
 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The first part presents a review of 
literature linking social network effects to trust in police. The second section describes the 
methods and data to be utilized in the analysis. Section three presents and interprets the 
results of the analysis while section four engages in an extended policy discussion of the 
implications of this paper for policy and thinking about generating trust in police. The 
conclusion discusses some of the limitations of the present study. 
 
 
Social Network Effects 
 
Social network effects. Known variously as peer effects, social spillover effects, 
neighborhood effects, herd behavior and peer pressure, social network effects are defined 
as “the propensity of an individual to behave in some way with the prevalence of that 
behaviour in some reference group containing the individual” (Manski 1993: 531; see also: 
Brock and Durlauf 2001, 2002; Manski 2000). Put another way, a social network effect 
exists if individuals are influenced in their attitudes or behaviors by the aggregate attitudes 
or behaviors of their social reference group. Why might an individual might adopt the 
attitudes and behaviors of their peer reference group? The reason for adoption falls roughly 
into two categories. The first category is based on an individual having an underlying 
preference for conformity and find disutility in being the only person who thinks or behaves 
a certain way. The second category views the adoption of a modality (e.g., trusting police) 
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by others as a type of information signal: if other people in my reference group trust police, 
they must have information about the police that I do not.  
The existence of a social network effect for trust in police is important for two 
reasons. First, it would mean that an individual’s inclination to trust police would be 
influenced by the individual’s reference group’s aggregate-level behavior of trusting 
police. Thus, an individual who might otherwise be inclined to trust police may adopt a 
non-trusting posture toward them if his/her neighbors, family members and friends do not 
trust police. Previous research on endogenous social network effects has shown how 
individual-level decisions are influenced by aggregate-level group attitudes and behaviors; 
examples of the positive impact of endogenous social network effects on individual-level 
decisions can be found across a wide variety of social phenomena. In the fields of clinical 
and public health, it has been argued that network effects are germane to the behavioral 
trait of obesity and that obesity appears to spread through social ties (e.g., Christakis and 
Fowler 2007; Fowler and Christakis 2008a, 2008b). In transportation economics, scholars 
have found an endogenous social network effect for transportation mode choice (i.e., 
walking, taking transit, driving, car-pooling, etc.) and automobile ownership (e.g., Goetzke 
2006; Goetzke and Weinberger 2012), indicating that individual mode choice is influenced 
by aggregate tract-level mode choice. And in marketing, research has shown that 
individuals have a higher probability of product or service adoption if they are connected 
to many other adopters (e.g., Katona, Zubczsek and Sarvary 2010; Trusov, Bucklin and 
Pauwels 2009). It is therefore not a stretch to suggest that a social network effect for police 
trust exists. 
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Second, the existence of social network effects implies multiple equilibria, meaning 
that the aggregate outcome may be path dependent. Path dependency is a self-
reinforcement mechanism: each step along a given path increases the returns for and 
likelihood of continuing along that same path, while switching from that course to a 
previously viable alternative option cannot be accomplished without incurring significant 
costs (Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000). Social processes, like economic processes, may not 
move steadily toward an efficient equilibrium but instead the character of the equilibrium 
depends, at least in part, on the starting point and the process of getting there (Liebowitz 
and Margolis 2000). Path dependent processes will therefore not necessarily converge 
toward an optimal equilibrium but rather reach one of several equilibria, and “[t]here is no 
guarantee that the particular outcome selected from among the many alternatives will be 
the ‘best’ one” (Arthur 1994: 1). Thus, if a critical share of members within a reference 
group adopt that same modality (e.g., trusting police), the probability of another individual 
connected to that reference group adopting the same modality increases, while the 
probability of making the opposite choice (not trusting police) is significantly diminished. 
In other words, historical events can have durable, persistent effects on present behaviors 
that may be difficult to reverse. 
The study of social network effects is not foreign to the criminal justice literature, 
but there is an important distinction between an endogenous social network effect and the 
contextual or “neighborhood effects” used in the criminal justice literature. The term 
“neighborhood effects” is used to describe the impact of two concepts: concentrated 
disadvantage and collective efficacy. Concentrated disadvantage refers to the one-way 
impact of the structural (ecological) characteristics of place on life outcomes, such as the 
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effect of concentrated poverty on child and adolescent development or the impact of shared 
perceptions of disorder on later poverty (Wilson 2012; Sampson 2012). Concentrated 
disadvantage is typically modeled using measures aggregated to the spatial unit of analysis 
(i.e., place-level, tract-level, block-level, etc.) and suggests that these contextual variables 
have a one-way impact on individual-level outcome variables.  
The term “collective efficacy” on the other hand is used to refer to group-level 
norms of trust and reciprocity that influence individual behavior among spatially 
contiguous residents (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012, 2013; 
Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush 2001). Scholars have used collective efficacy to 
explain a variety of social phenomena, including disparities in crime rates across 
neighborhoods and communities: Where collective efficacy is high, levels of crime and 
violence are low and where collective efficacy is low, levels of crime and violence are high 
(Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson 2012, 
2013). The implication is that aggregate neighborhood social trust (collective efficacy) and 
shared perceptions of social disorder shape individual decisions to intervene on behalf of 
the neighborhood as an agent of social control, which is similar to the workings of a social 
network effect. However, collective efficacy is not modeled as an endogenous social 
network effect but rather as an individual-level perception of neighborhood- or community-
levels of collective efficacy.  
However, the discussion of social network effects presented in this paper and the 
literature on neighborhood effects in criminal justice differ an important way. Concentrated 
disadvantage might more accurately be described as a contextual effect rather than an 
endogenous social network effect. Contextual effects are one-way social interaction of 
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attitudes or behaviors from the group-level to the individual-level that vary with group 
characteristics (i.e., socioeconomic characteristics of the community population), whereas 
endogenous social network effects are bi-directional spillovers in which the attitudes or 
behaviors of the reference group affects the attitudes or behaviors of the individual (Manski 
1993, 2000; Goetzke and Weinberger 2012). The contextual effect of socioeconomic status 
is unidirectional and varies along with the socioeconomic conditions and built environment 
characteristics in which residents find themselves: child and adolescent development, 
crime and violence are impacted by socioeconomic status, but socioeconomic status is not 
impacted by child or adolescent development, crime or violence. A truly endogenous social 
network effect would run both ways, as could be argued is the case for collective efficacy: 
individual-level decisions to intervene on behalf of neighborhood kids aggregates to the 
community level of collective efficacy while community-level collective efficacy 
influences individual-level decisions to intervene. This paper is concerned with analyzing 
the influence of endogenous social network effects on trust in police rather than the effects 
of neighborhood contextual effects on resident attitudes.  
One way to conceptualize this difference between the two kinds of effects is that 
contextual effects vary by group characteristic, so contextual effects will vary with 
socioeconomic status, educational attainment, ethnicity, age, etc. This influence is only in 
one direction: group characteristics influence individual behavior, but individual behavior 
does not influence group characteristics (e.g., an individual attempting to increase his or 
her educational attainment does not mean that categories of educational attainment 
change). Endogenous social network effect varies with the prevalence of an attitude or 
behavior within a social reference group. That group may be made up of individuals with 
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various characteristics or even who live in spatially discontinuous areas. These effects are 
bi-directional; that is, as a behavior becomes prevalent amongst a critical share of that 
group, that group behavior influences the individual’s behavior, but at the same time, the 
individual’s behavior aggregates or makes up part of the group level behavior, indicating 
a reflection problem. 
Data, Model and Variables 
To examine whether a social network effect for trust in police exists, this paper 
draws from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (Saguaro Seminar 2000), the 2000 
F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report (Kaplan 2019), the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics Series (U.S. Department of Justice 2000) and the U.S. Decennial 
Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) databases. All data sets have the base year of 2000. 
Data. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey aims to provide a standardized 
measurement of social capital across American communities which can be used to gauge 
variations in social capital in the future. To date, this survey remains one of the richest 
sources of social capital data in the United States. The survey, conducted via telephone 
interview from February to July 1999, consists of over 29,000 observations from 40 
communities in the United States providing data which assesses individual-level 
perceptions and attitudes toward civic and social interactions. The restricted use version of 
the data set provides geocoding which enables matching of individual-level responses to 
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geographical places and adds a spatial dimension to the analysis of social capital. The 
survey is relevant to the current study because it contains the outcome variable (trust in 
local police), the main social network effect policy variable (police trust network) which 
can easily be derived from the outcome variable as well as the individual-level 
sociodemographic characteristics used as controls. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey 
has been used in the past to measure trust in police. For example, MacDonald and Stokes 
(2006) use trust in police as an outcome variable in their examination of whether 
community-level social processes related to social capital explain racial and community 
variations in the trust of police, but whereas they were interested in the role social capital 
plays in influencing trust in police at the individual-level, this paper is interested in the 
impact of an aggregate-level endogenous social network effect on individual-level trust in 
police. Sharp and Johnson (2009) test a variety of explanations for variation in distrust of 
local police in the U.S. using a derivation of the trust in police variable. However, their 
model uses contextual effects as a control for variation in the dependent variable due to 
unobserved heterogeneity in the city rather than taking as their main policy variable the 
endogenous social network effect for trust in police.  
The 2000 U.S. Decennial Census provides a rich source of aggregate socio-
demographic data and structural variables geocoded to the place-levels which permits 
merging with the Social Capital Benchmark Survey and the other data sources for the 
analysis which will be discussed. Decennial Census data has been combined with the Social 
Capital Benchmark survey in previous research to explore the impact of social capital on 
homicide rates (e.g., Rosenfeld, Baumer and Messner 2001; Messner, Baumer and 
Rosenfeld 2004), spatial and individual determinants of a variety of outcomes including 
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happiness, quality of life, newspaper readership (Williamson 2010) and social capital and 
segregated public schools (Jones-Sanpei 2009). 
 The F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report has served as a nationwide periodic assessment 
of reported crimes not available elsewhere in the criminal justice system since 1930. The 
2000 Offenses Known and Clearances by Arrest data files, collect monthly data on the 
number of Index Crime offenses reported and the number of offenses cleared by arrest or 
other means. The counts include all reports of Index Crimes (excluding arson) received 
from victims, officers who discovered infractions, or other sources. Uniform Crime Report 
data can be merged by originating agency identifier to the Law Enforcement Agency 
Crosswalk Identifier which facilitates the matching of aggregate levels of crime to the 
place-level geographic areas. 
The Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics series is a 
periodic survey of law enforcement agency resources, personnel and responsibilities from 
law enforcement agencies at the state, county and municipal levels. Agencies reported in 
this series can be matched to specific place-level geographic locations using the Law 
Enforcement Agency Identifier Crosswalk data file.  
 
Model. The model used for this paper is a two-stage instrumental variable probit 
(TSIVP) model to estimate an individual’s decision to trust police or not as well as to 
account for endogeneity in the analysis. This method calls for a first step OLS regression 
with the endogenous effect as the dependent variable on the instrumental variables. The 
residuals of the first step and the measured endogenous effect are used in the second-step 
binary choice probit model (Woolridge 2015). An instrumental variable approach is 
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appropriate when analyzing social network effects. By the definition discussed earlier, 
social network effects are endogenous because they influence the dependent variable while 
being themselves influenced by the dependent variable. This scenario is called the 
reflection problem (Manski 1993; 2000) and it confounds analysis using linear approaches 
like the ordinary least squares model because that model cannot disentangle individual-
level effects from contextual, endogenous or correlated effects. However, it is possible to 
use probit or logit models (e.g., two-stage instrumental variable probit, two-stage 
instrumental variable ordered probit), as described by Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2002) 
because these models are non-linear, which means that endogenous, contextual and 
correlated effects do not depend on one another as they do in linear approaches and thus 
their effects can be isolated for analysis. In this case the main policy variable, the 
aggregate-level police trust network, is endogenous to individual-level trust in police. In 
other words, both variables suffer from the reflection/simultaneity problem: aggregate-
level network trust influences individual-level trust, which in turn is a component of 
aggregate-level network trust. In order to disentangle the individual- from the aggregate-
level effect, it will be necessary to select valid instruments which affect the dependent 
variable through the endogenous explanatory variable, but which are exogenous to the 
outcome variable. Two instruments were selected and a discussion of them follows later. 
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable for this study is individual-level trust 
in police. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey asked respondents how much they 
personally trust the institution of the police using a 4-point scale with higher scores 
indicating more trust in police (0 = not at all; 1= a little; 2= some; 3= a lot). Although this 
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variable measures trust by degrees, for the purposes of this study it was unclear what 
magnitude difference exists between “a little” trust and “some” trust. For this reason 
several specifications of the dependent variable were explored, ultimately leading to the 
creation of a dichotomous variable combining the top and bottom two categories so as to 
model a clear bifurcation of individual-level trust in police (0 = not at all and a little; 1 = 
some and a lot). The mean for individual-level trust in police is 0.808 which is very similar 
to the mean for the aggregate-level trust in police network effect which is 0.803. Merging 
the data sets together resulted in a reduction of the total N for the data set. Many of the 
observations from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey did not have place-level identifiers 
and so were excluded a priori, while data was not available for all police departments or 
for all months of the year in the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics which contributed to another drop in observations, leaving the total N for the 
model at 6,347. Because the loss of observations was largely due to combining data sets, 
the randomness of the sample is preserved. A list of variables, their sources and descriptive 
statistics are presented in Table 1, below. 
[TABLE 1] 
Explanatory variables. The main explanatory variable for this study is the place-
level social network effect for trust in police which was created using the individual-level 
trust in police measure from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Equation (1) below 
shows the procedure for creating the network effect variable. This variable was created by 
aggregating individual-level trust in police to the place-level, subtracting the individual 
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from the aggregate and dividing the aggregate by the remaining number of residents at that 
place. As discussed in the section on social network effects, the resulting variable is an 
endogenous effect given its simultaneity; that is, the behavior of the individual is affected 
by the behavior of the peer group while the behavior of the peer group is also the aggregate 
of individual behavior. In this model the endogenous effects are addressed through an 
instrumental variable approach. A positive sign would signify the presence of a social 
network effect. 
(Place-level aggregate trust in police – Individual-level trust in police) (1) (# of respondents at place-level – individual respondent) 
Instruments. The challenge to using an instrumental variable approach is to find 
valid instruments which are only correlated to the endogenous explanatory variable that 
are not also correlated with the dependent variable. A valid instrument for this model 
should have an exogenous impact on the social network variable (aggregate-level of trust 
in police) but not have a direct effect on the individuals’ trust in police. Two instruments 
were selected which are theoretically and empirically appropriate instruments. The first is 
the place-level median household income for 1999 taken from the U.S. Decennial Census 
2000; the second is the violent crime rate per capita for 1968 taken from the F.B.I.’s 
Uniform Crime Report 1968. The rationale for choosing these instruments is that they are 
not directly correlated with the dependent variable but are correlated with the endogenous 
social network effect. Place-level median household income was chosen because it is 
exogenous and not correlated directly with individual-level trust in police: median income 
can influence aggregate trust in police in that higher median incomes are indicative of 
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greater aggregate trust in police but individual trust in police does not influence place-level 
median income. Violent crime per capita for 1968 are also exogenous and, due to its 
temporal distance from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000, is unlikely to be 
correlated with individual-level trust in police. Place-level median income is expected to 
relate positively with the endogenous social network effect while violent crime in 1968 
should be relate negatively to it. 
Controls. Twelve control variables were added to account for variations in the 
outcome (trust in police) stemming from unobserved heterogeneity in the population. The 
first nine are comprised of respondent-level socio-demographic characteristics and are 
taken from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000. These include an item indicating 
whether the respondent is male, black, Hispanic, currently rents his/her residence, 
respondent’s age category, respondent’s income level, whether the respondent is 
unemployed and whether the respondent has an educational attainment below the high 
school level. The last three control for place-level characteristics relevant for criminal 
justice analysis, including the number of full-time sworn officers with arrest powers per 
capita and community police officers as a percentage of full-time sworn officers with arrest 
powers. Both variables were drawn from the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics 2000 data set. The final variable, violent crime per capita for 
2000, was drawn from the F.B.I.’s Uniform Crime Report 2000. 
The theory presented in this paper does not offer specific guidance as to the 
expected signs for the control variables, but previous research has consistently indicated 
that trust in police tends to be lower for males, Blacks, Hispanics, renters, young people, 
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the unemployed and those with lower educational attainment (see: Sampson 2012; Brunson 
2007; Brunson and Miller 2006; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; Weitzer and Tuch 
1999). Further, current numbers of regular police, community policing officers and violent 
crimes may also influence trust in police. The broken windows theory of crime control 
posits that community members would feel safer because of increased police presence 
(Wilson and Kelling 1982); the community policing philosophy was designed with the 
intention of building trust between police and minority communities (Trojanowicz 1986). 
Yet, the presence of additional community policing or regular officers could be interpreted 
by residents as a signal of relative security/insecurity, not to mention that trusting police is 
often a function of race and characteristics of the built environment. Further, current levels 
of violent crime can be interpreted that police are either very good at their jobs (crime 
control and deterrence) or very bad at it, meaning levels of trust in police might be 
influenced either way here as well.  
Results 
Using the instrumental variable approach, the instruments pass the 
overidentification, weak instruments and exogeneity tests. The overidentification test 
evaluates the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, or, 
to put it another way, that they are uncorrelated with the outcome variable and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A failure to reject the null hypothesis would bring 
into question the validity of those instruments; as can be seen in Table 2, the tests failed to 
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reject the null hypothesis, indicating that these are in fact valid instruments correctly 
excluded. The weak instrument test evaluates empirically whether the selected instruments 
are relevant to the endogenous variable. The test has as its null hypothesis that selected 
instruments are weak if they fail to pass a critical threshold. The critical value for weak 
instruments was exceeded, suggesting these instruments are relevant. The Wald exogeneity 
test evaluates whether an excluded endogenous variable is actually exogenous. The social 
network effect fails to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald exogeneity test, suggesting 
that the instrumented variable is exogenous. However, it is still expected from the 
perspective of theory that the social network effect for trust in police is endogenous 
regardless of the test. Therefore, two models are presented here which confirm the social 
network effect. Model 1 displays the first and second stage of the instrumental variable 
probit model with a binary dependent variable for trust in police while Model 2 shows the 
first and second stage of an ordered probit model with an ordinal dependent variable for 
trust in police. If both models are significant, it gives confidence that the social network 
effect indeed exists. 
 [TABLE 2] 
As can be seen in Table 3, the main finding of Model 1 suggests that there is a 
social network effect for trust in police. That is the significant positive coefficient on the 
social network effect implies that individuals are influenced in their decision to trust police 
by the trust placed in police of those around them. Model 2’s results, which can be seen in 
Table 4, mirror those of Model 1 in the sign and significance of the presence of a social 
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network effect. The fact that both Models 1 and 2 show the social network effect to be 
significant adds a level of confidence to the results presented here. In the first stage in both 
models the instruments are significant for the social network effect; that is, violent crime 
per capita in 1968 is negative and significant for the social network effect while place-level 
median income is positive and significant for the effect.  
Several of the control variables had the correct signs and significance as predictors 
of individual-level trust in police, consistent with prior research (e.g., Weitzer and Tuch 
1999; MacDonald and Stokes 2006; Sharp and Johnson 2009). Male, black and Hispanic 
are significant and negative for trust in police, as are young age, low income and 
educational attainment less than high school. Being single is significant and negative in 
Model 2, indicating that unmarried or never married individuals trust police less, but single 
is not significant in Model 1. The log pseudo-likelihood for the model is 4041.126. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Two additional unexpected results were also uncovered. The first relates to place-
level aggregation of violent crime and trust in police. In the model, violent crime per capita 
is not a significant predictor of trust in police. That is, an individual’s level of trust in police 
is not influenced by an area’s violent crime rates. This finding challenges the crime control 
and deterrence model of policing’s performance-based approach to garnering public trust, 
which holds that police effectiveness at producing public safety related outcomes (e.g., low 
crime rate, absence of conspicuous neglect) influences individual levels of trust in police. 
What this result does not suggest is that police performance is irrelevant to considerations 
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of public trust in police; indeed, an incompetent police force would also be unlikely to 
enjoy a high level of trust from the public it serves (e.g., Sampson and Bartusch 1998). 
Rather, this result resembles an important finding of the 1970s that fear of crime, rather 
than actual crime rates, led individuals to abrogate their guardianship role of public spaces 
(Greene 1987, 2000). The significance of that conclusion, which is echoed here, is that 
crime rates do not have an impact on trust in police in the same way that crime rates do not 
have an impact on fear of crime. 
The second unexpected result from this model is the non-significance of the number 
of police per capita and the percentage of the police force working as community policing 
officers in predicting individual-level trust in police. The presence of police has an impact 
on the social network effect such that more police makes the community trust the police 
less but doesn’t have any additional effect on the individual’s decision to trust police. The 
conspicuous presence of police officers in an area has been argued to have varying effects 
on police trust. On one hand, the classical broken windows and crime control and 
deterrence view is that additional police officers on foot patrol create a feeling of security 
in neighborhood residents owing to the accessibility of officers and increased formal order 
maintenance, reduced fear of crime and increased risk of apprehension (Moore, 
Trojanowicz and Kelling 1988). Under this view, “seeing” police in an area produces a net 
positive for that area, which hints at increased perceptions of the trustworthiness of police 
and police institutions. On the other hand, proponents of labelling theory and critics of the 
community policing philosophy argue that an increased police presence is a sign of an 
area’s insecurity and delinquency, which could lead to increased fear of crime, shifts in 
perceptions of public disorder and suspicion among residents, all of which could contribute 
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to a reduction in the share of trust afforded to police officers (Greene and Taylor 1988; 
Goffman 1978). The finding from this model will not settle the debate; it is enough to note 
that in this model police per capita is significant for trust in police through the social 
network effect. 
Policy Discussion 
In the context of police efforts to foster trust with members of the community, this 
finding is important because it suggests that increased quality and quantity of police-public 
contact, fair procedure or positive outcomes may not be sufficient to counteract the social 
network effect. Individuals are embedded within social networks and share experiences 
and narratives with other members, meaning that police efforts at building trust with 
various communities cannot be a matter of simply change tactics: a critical share of the 
community must be swayed into trusting police before individuals in low police trust areas 
will change their behavior. At the same time, the results of this regression imply that trust 
in police, once attained by a critical number of individuals within a community, is unlikely 
to be easily lost as a result of individual police behavior.  
One way of interpreting social network effects is through the concepts of tipping 
points and collective memory. A tipping point is a “moment of critical mass” at which an 
attitude or behavior within a group or within some proportion a group is widely adopted 
by other members of that group (Gladwell 2000: 12; Grodzins 1957; Schelling 1971). The 
presence of a social network effect implies multiple equilibria; that is, a process can have 
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several outcomes, some of which are static and others of which are dynamic. The dynamic 
equilibria are unstable and can be “tipped” toward one static modality or another if a critical 
share of individuals adopt that modality. Research has demonstrated that tipping points 
exist for wearing a style of clothing (e.g., Gladwell 2000), automobile ownership (e.g., 
Goetzke and Weinberger 2012) and racial segregation (Grodzins 1957; Schelling 1971).  
The term collective memory is frequently used by sociologists to refer to “the 
memory and representations of group pasts—whether these be ethnic, national, global, or 
other collective historical events” (Teeger 2014: 71). Maurice Halbwachs, often credited 
with founding the theory (Teeger 2014), was primarily interested in the intersection of 
individuals as group members, space and the impressions they leave on one another, which 
is similar to the concept of social network effects. Halbwachs writes: “[M]ost 
groups…engrave their form in some way upon the soil and retrieve their collective 
remembrances within the spatial framework thus defined” (1992: 14). Previous research 
has demonstrated that incidents of police misconduct are shared through family, friend, 
neighbor and other social group networks and can affect individual perceptions of trust in 
police (see: Brunson 2007; Brunson and Miller 2006; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007; 
King, Messner and Baller 2009). However, these studies were qualitative in nature and not 
looking specifically for the presence of a social network effect for trust in police. Instead, 
researchers were interested in understanding how African American youth understand and 
evaluate police in their neighborhoods. Comments suggesting the presence of a social 
network effect were elicited as a corollary to the main objective. 
Bo Rothstein contends that collective memories are important because they 
(collective memories) can explain individuals’ choice of strategy (i.e., trust/not trust) when 
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encountering other individuals, groups and public institutions. He argues that the theory of 
collective memory explains why some societies find themselves in a low trust social trap 
(Rothstein 2005). A social trap is a situation in which two parties could be made better off 
were they to cooperate with and trust one another, but neither party wants to be the first 
mover and so no one benefits. The difficulty in getting out of the social trap is heightened 
by the collective memory of past incivilities, real or perceived, which have endured and 
been passed down through generations and which cannot rationally be forgotten. Rothstein 
writes: “The problem of low interpersonal trust comes from discriminated groups having 
been forced to live under public political institutions that have been, or which they have 
believed to have been, deeply dysfunctional for them. The collective memory of things 
such as gross police brutality, public lynchings, and systematic discrimination has a 
tremendous effect on the belief systems of which the individuals in a group such as this 
become the bearers” (Rothstein 2005: 127-128).  
This scenario can lead to a static path dependency for trust in police. As a critical 
share of an individual’s peer group do not trust police, the likelihood that the individual 
will also not trust police increases. Continuing along the non-trusting path makes 
subsequent steps along that path easier; however, the cost of returning to a previously 
viable alternative, in this case trusting police, becomes more and more difficult, if not 
impossible. Another way to think about what Rothstein is saying here is that memories of 
past events form part of an individual’s mental map regarding which groups and institutions 
in society can be trusted, which then influences in the present the decision to trust 
individual members from these groups or institutions. The effect of collective memory 
could be one reason why the violent crime per capita for 1968 variable was significant. 
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Individually people do not think of violent crime in 1968 when deciding to trust police, but 
collectively (e.g., through the social network effect) it has an impact. Thus, when it come 
to the decision to trust police, history matters. 
Rothstein’s idea that the collective memory of historical institutions could lead to 
path dependent outcomes is lent support by a burgeoning literature on the impact of 
historical institutions on contemporary behaviors and narratives (for an overview, see: 
Nunn 2009). Scholars have investigated the effect of slavery on economic development 
both in and out of Africa (Bertocchi 2016), the link between historically high 
concentrations of slaves and persistent levels of inequality, weak institutions, violent and 
property crime in Colombia (Buonanno and Vargas 2016) and Brazil (Fujiwara, Laudares 
and Valencia C. 2019), persistent rates of regional entrepreneurship in Germany (Fritsch 
and Wyrwich 2013), medieval persecution of Jews and anti-Semitic violence in Nazi 
Germany (Voigtlander and Voth 2012), a “Hapsburg effect” for trust in government 
(Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann 2011) and lynchings, anti-Civil Rights 
Movement violence and contemporary voting behavior of African Americans (Peterson 
and Ward 2015). Perhaps the best example of the consequence of historical institutions on 
contemporary attitudes toward trust in police is given by Tankebe (2008; see also Tankebe 
2009). He states that human rights violations, police corruption and police impunity are 
salient characteristics of police service in Ghana and that these characteristics can be traced 
to the operating philosophy of former colonial police. He writes that “[t]hese abuses have 
alienated the police even more from many Ghanians, which leads to a significant distrust 
in the official mission of the police— ‘service with integrity’” (Tankebe 2009: 1271).  
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The challenge for police trust and legitimacy scholars is how to get out of a low 
trust path dependent trap and convince a critical share of individuals within a reference 
group to trust police and cooperate with them. Tyler’s procedural fairness perspective 
offers some empirically-based guidance on this at the individual level (Tyler 1990, 2003, 
2005; Sunshine and Tyler 2003); research has demonstrated if police deal with members 
of the public in a fair and respectful manner that individuals’ perceptions of the 
trustworthiness and legitimacy of police institutions should increase, but what this paper 
has attempted to show is that peer group influence and collective memories are also factors 
that need to be addressed before a perspective like procedural fairness can gain the kind of 
broad-based trust and legitimacy police institutions desire. If collective memories lead to a 
path dependent outcome of low trust in police, however, it may be the case that individual 
trusting behavior may be difficult if not impossible to reverse. Thus, the stakes for police 
are extremely high. 
Fortunately, Rothstein has some suggestions for overcoming collective memory 
and breaking out of a low trust social trap. His first suggestion is actually directed toward 
battling corruption within institutions, but the theory could conceivably work in any 
situation in which some form of institutional path dependency exists, be that police or 
neighborhood institutions. Rothstein calls this the indirect big bang approach to fighting 
corruption, and the basic premise is that trying to tackle corruption within an institution 
incrementally and head on is likely to fail because there is a system underlying the 
corruption that will resist direct efforts to tinker with different parts of the system to try 
and eliminate that corruption (Rothstein 2011). In other words, Rothstein is saying that 
small-scale, incremental changes will likely be counteracted by forces within an institution 
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to maintain the status quo. What is needed is to “attack” corruption by getting the institution 
off balance; that is, by addressing the corruption in large-scale, sweeping changes that do 
not give institutional actors a chance to adjust their tactics. Rothstein’s indirect big bang 
approach has clear parallels to addressing the influence of social network effects and 
collective memories for trust in police. Rothstein says that collective memories cannot be 
rationally forgotten; attempts at changing perceptions of police trustworthiness and 
legitimacy incrementally provides too many opportunities for the larger social network 
effect to adjust and return to the status quo (Rothstein 2005, 2011). An indirect big bang 
approach to dealing with a social network effect for trust might, for example, work with 
key neighborhood or community institutions on non-enforcement related matters that 
challenge the narrative influence of collective memories in a large-scale and conspicuous 
manner. In this way police can set the social network effect “off-balance” so that 
individual-level efforts at trust building have a chance to succeed. 
What kind of indirect big bang approach is needed to unbalance the influence of a 
social network effect and collective memory? Following Rothstein, the answer is to take 
as a guiding normative principle for the exercise of police authority the concept of 
deontological impartiality (2011). Deontological (or universal) impartiality is central to 
overcoming low trust social traps because it eschews partial, biased behavior on the part of 
institutional actors, which has been one of the perennial concerns among minority and 
vulnerable populations regarding police services (see: Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson 
2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007). Adopting a normative value like universal 
impartiality might serve to set both police institutions and the publics they serve off-
balance such that changing attitudes and behaviors becomes possible.  
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Conclusion 
The findings reported here support the existence of a social network effect for trust 
in police. The value of this paper is that it reveals previously unaddressed factors, social 
network effects and collective memory, that influences trust in police, allowing for a more 
nuanced understanding of the challenge of garnering perceptions of trust and legitimacy 
for police. Contemporary approaches to changing perceptions of police trustworthiness do 
not consider the influence of peer effects or path dependency, meaning that their policy 
prescriptions may miss important opportunities for gaining the kind of broad-based 
perceptions of trust and legitimacy those approaches strive for. 
In considering the findings presented in this study, it is important to recognize some 
limitations. The first limitation is that while the Social Capital Benchmark Survey remains 
one of the richest sources of data in the United States measuring social capital, trust, quality 
of life and other related concepts, an ideal dataset would be a longitudinal panel survey 
designed specifically to assess the factors influencing individual-level trust in police. The 
longitudinal panel design would allow the evaluation of changes in an individual’s trust 
modalities over time, which makes possible the causal analysis of smaller-scale, individual-
level police tactics aimed at gaining more trust for police with larger-scale, aggregate-level 
changes to police institutional behavior that may confound in cross-sectional analysis.  
The second major limitation is that a quantitative research design such as that 
presented in this paper cannot fully capture the role or impact of collective memories on 
contemporary trust attitudes and behaviors. Much work on collective memory is qualitative 
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in nature (see: Teeger 2014; Brunson 2007; Carr, Napolitano and Keating 2007) and relies 
on in-depth interviews to probe not only the content of specific collective memories but 
also how those memories are used to explain current societal conditions. Teeger (2014) 
presents an excellent example of just this type of analysis. Teeger interviewed blacks and 
white South African managers and professionals to explore how they selectively use South 
Africa’s apartheid past as an explanans for contemporary crime problems. Research 
findings indicate that blacks and whites invoke their apartheid past in differing ways to 
explain crime: as both continuity and rupture. Understanding how and when individuated 
collective memories of police malfeasance become salient is an important step toward 
breaking out of a low trust social trap and gaining the kind of broad-based trust and 
legitimacy currently sought by criminal justice practitioners and scholars. 
In conclusion, the main argument of this paper has been that there is strong evidence 
for the existence a social network effect for trust in police exists and that its existence has 
important consequences for contemporary efforts to garner trust in police. The empirical 
analysis supported this hypothesis. The policy implication of the social network effect is 
that trust in police has a tipping point and can lead to path dependent outcomes which 
require the adoption of a guiding norm like impartiality in order to unbalance. The 
significance of this paper is that brings a deeper understanding of social network effects 
into the criminal justice literature from other fields which have studied network effects in 
the manner presented here in order to present a model of trust in police that deepens the 
conceptual nuance to this most important issue of trust in police. 
98 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variables. 
Variable Definition Min Max Mean S.D. 
Dependent Variable 
     Trust in police 0 1 0.808 0.394 
Main Policy Variable 
 Social network effect for trust in police 0 1 0.803 0.099 
Instruments 
 Violent crime per capita for 1968 0 0.021 0.005 0.003 
     Place-level median household income for 1999 
(per thousand) 
12.917 88.771 37.091 7.168 
Controls 
 Male respondent 0 1 0.402 0.490 
 Black respondent 0 1 0.240 0.427 
 Hispanic respondent 0 1 0.107 0.310 
 Respondent residence: rent 0 1 0.415 0.493 
 Respondent age less than or equal to 30 0 1 0.274 0.446 
 Respondent income less than 30,000 0 1 0.357 0.479 
 Respondent unemployed 0 1 0.030 0.171 
 Respondent single and never married 0 1 0.343 0.475 
 Respondent education less than high school 0 1 0.319 0.467 
 Number of full-time sworn police per capita 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.001 
 Community police officers as percentage of total 
police 
0.083 0.192 0 1 
 Violent crime per capita for 2000 0.000 0.028 0.010 0.005 
N = 6,347 
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Table 4.2. Instrumental variable tests. 
Tests of endogeneity (H0 = variables are 
exogenous) 
Value p 
 Durbin χ2 0.912 0.339 
 Wu-Hausman F 0.910 0.340 
 Wald χ2 1.78 0.182 
Overidentifcation (H0 = instruments are valid) χ2 p 
 Sargan 0.006 0.937 
 Basmann 0.006 0.937 
Weak Instruments (H0 = instruments are weak) Critical Value [TSLS, LIML] 
 Montiel-Pflueger F-statistic 98.092 [6.234, 13.560] 
TSLS = Two-stage least squares; LIML = Limited information maximum likelihood 
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 Table 4.3: Two-stage least squares equation model for trust in police 
Model (1) 
Type of Variable Continuous Binary 
Method OLS ivprobit 
Number of Observations 6,347 6,347 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared --- --- 
Police Trust Network Effect --- 2.266*** (1.108) 
Violent Crime Per Capita (1968) -2.239**(0.950) --- 
Place-level Median Income (1999) Per Thousand 0.003***(0.000) --- 
Male -0.001 (0.002) 
-0.137*** 
(0.039) 
Black -0.003 (0.003) 
-0.752*** 
(0.047) 
Hispanic -0.009**(0.004) 
-0.452*** 
(0.064) 
Rent 0.002 (0.002) 
-0.046 
(0.043) 
Age Less Than or Equal to 30 0.001 (0.003) 
-0.287*** 
(0.048) 
Low Income 0.001 (0.002) 
-0.120*** 
(0.044) 
Unemployed -0.006 (0.007) 
-0.118 
(0.105) 
Single -0.008***(0.002) 
-0.063 
(0.046) 
Less Than High School Education -0.003 (0.003) 
-0.230*** 
(0.044) 
Police Officers Per Capita -47.692*** (1.721) 
5.723 
(70.187) 
Percentage of Community Policing Officers -0.017* (0.009) 
-0.035 
(0.100) 
Violent Crime Per Capita (2000) 0.226 (0.458) 
6.693 
(5.217) 
Constant 0.840***(0.010) 
-0.415 
(1.094) 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors are in parenthesis
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 Table 4.4: Two-stage ordered probit equation model for trust in police 
Model (2) 
Type of Variable Continuous Ordered 
Method OLS oprobit 
Number of Observations 6,347 6,347 
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared 0.417 0.061 
Police Trust Network Effect --- 0.738** (0.377) 
Violent Crime Per Capita (1968) -2.965** (1.349) --- 
Place-level Median Income (1999) Per Thousand 0.006***(0.000) --- 
Male -0.000 (0.005) 
-0.107*** 
(0.029) 
Black -0.011* (0.006) 
-0.742*** 
(0.036) 
Hispanic -0.013 (0.009) 
-0.366*** 
(0.049) 
Rent 0.003 (0.006) 
-0.012 
(0.032) 
Age Less Than or Equal to 30 0.003 (0.006) 
-0.246*** 
(0.036) 
Low Income 0.000 (0.006) 
-0.040 
(0.033) 
Unemployed -0.011 (0.014) 
-0.114 
(0.082) 
Single -0.018***(0.006) 
-0.103*** 
(0.034) 
Less Than High School Education -0.002 (0.006) 
-0.111*** 
(0.033) 
Police Officers Per Capita -136.985*** (4.039) 
-17.781 
(62.193) 
Percentage of Community Policing Officers -0.011 (0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.074) 
Violent Crime Per Capita (2000) -5.292***(0.806) 
5.467 
(4.564) 
Constant 2.379***(0.020) --- 
*p < .1, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors are in parenthesis
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The overall findings of this dissertation are two. First, universal impartiality, in 
addition to procedural fairness and police performance, is a significant predictor of trust in 
police. That is, when people think about trusting police, considerations like police 
performance and procedural fairness are important, but so too do people think about 
impartiality. This is exactly Rothstein’s point about impartiality fits in with subjective 
impressions of fairness. He argued that subjective perceptions of procedural fairness are 
important to government’s ability to attain political legitimacy, but the norm by which 
individuals will evaluate the “fairness” of the procedure is by the universal and impartial 
nature of the implementation of that policy, not by some narrow concern with fairness as 
it applies to the individual. It is also interesting that police performance remains a 
significant predictor of trust in police. As discussed in the review of literature, the police 
performance model was an implicit trust model in that the better police performed the more 
likely people would trust them. The findings here support that claim. 
The second finding is that a social network effect for trust in police exists and the 
magnitude of its influence can be measured. The coefficient on the police trust network 
variable was positive and significant, indicating the presence of a self-reinforcing social 
network effect. That is, individuals are influenced in their decision to trust police by the 
prevalence of that trust in that individual’s social reference groups. This finding adds 
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broadens the criminal justice literature on the role of vicarious influences or social network 
effects on trust in police. The criminal justice audience for this article conceptualize social 
network effects as neighborhood effects which are essentially the uni-directional 
contextual effects of some place-level attribute that varies with group characteristics. 
Endogenous social network effects, on the other hand, are bi-directional social effects that 
vary with the prevalence of an attitude or behavior in someone’s social reference group. 
One way to conceptualize this difference between the two kinds of effects is that contextual 
effects vary by group characteristic, so contextual effects will vary with socioeconomic 
status, educational attainment, ethnicity, age, etc. This influence is only in one direction: 
group characteristics influence individual behavior, but individual behavior does not 
influence group characteristics (e.g., an individual attempting to increase his or her 
educational attainment does not mean that educational attainment changes). Endogenous 
social network effect varies with the prevalence of an attitude or behavior within a social 
reference group. That group may be made up of individuals with various characteristics or 
even who live in spatially discontinuous areas. These effects are bi-directional; that is, as 
a behavior becomes prevalent amongst a critical share of that group, that group behavior 
influences the individual’s behavior, but at the same time, the individual’s behavior 
aggregates or makes up part of the group level behavior, indicating a reflection problem. 
Together these findings suggest that generating trust in police requires more than 
fair procedure. It involves exercising fair procedure within an impartial normative context 
which underscores the sincerity and commitment of police to procedural fairness policies. 
It also involves incorporating elements of the community policing philosophy in that the 
presence of a social network effect on trust in police means that the procedural fairness 
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approach needs to operate at the individual as well as the network level. Doing so may 
require what Rothstein calls an indirect big bang approach that sets the collective narrative 
of police mistrust “off-balance” long enough for progress in trust-building to be made.  
The dissertation had several limitations. The first limitation comes in article two 
with the need to use the European Social Survey Round 5. The European Social Survey is 
a rich trove of data on a variety of topics, including measures of personal well-being, 
politics, public attitudes toward climate change and justice. Despite this, the goal of this 
particular essay was to say something about police and impartiality in the United States. 
The United States has its own set of unique historical conditions which have led to current 
levels of police trust, which is true of the European data also, but which make direct 
comparisons based on the norms of institutions difficult. What can be said with some 
degree of certitude is that, at least in the European context, across countries and historical 
institutions, universal impartiality is a significant predictor of trust in police. Ideally, data 
such as these would be available in the American context. It could be argued that the United 
States and Western Europe would be somewhat comparable: both respond favorably to 
universal impartiality. However, that argument is speculative.  
The second limitation comes from the character of the data in both empirical 
articles. Both the European Social Survey and the Social Capital Benchmark Survey are 
cross-sectional in nature, which limits the scope for inferring causal relationships. In the 
ideal scenario, police performance, procedural fairness, universal impartiality and social 
capital data would be together in a longitudinal panel which would allow for better analysis 
of the impacts of these concepts on perceptions over time. Concepts like universal 
impartiality and social network effects are not likely to change in the short term because of 
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a new, more partial political and policing regime. If a society has come to expect universal 
impartiality from its public officials it will not throw that norm away even if the entire state 
behaves partially toward groups in society. This is not the case, however, for procedural 
fairness policing or police performance, especially in locations where universal 
impartiality is perceived to be low. Similarly with social network effects, it is unlikely that 
the influence of social network effects would abate in the short-term, but it may be the case 
that the effect of social networks is not consistent over time and could be stronger at some 
points relative to events in the community. Having data measured at regular intervals might 
help disentangle whether there is a causative relationship between police performance, 
procedural fairness and universal impartiality or whether past events – such as historical 
corruption of institutions (collective memory) – leads to path dependent outcomes. 
Another limitation is that people might have difficulty separating procedural 
fairness from impartiality. Even though the ESS Round 5 data set provides access to an 
array of individual perceptions regarding the police and the courts that is unsurpassed in 
its richness, questions such as that for fair treatment (“In the cases they deal with, do police 
treat victims in a fair and impartial manner?”) conflate the two concepts, making them 
analytically difficult to parse out, and thus having an impact on the level of certainty that 
can be carried by the conclusions presented here. One final limitation is that quantitative 
research designs may not capture the role or the impact of collective memories on 
contemporary trust attitudes and behaviors. Most collective memory work tends to be 
qualitative and relies on in-depth interviews to probe the content but also how these 
memories are used politically. It is important not only to understand what people’s 
perceptions of the police are but also to probe deeper into when and how these perceptions 
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articulate. So in addition to being able to understand how memory of the police is important 
to people, it should also be possible to measure how impactful those memories are viz a 
viz individual-level trust in police. 
The extensions which future research should examine follow from the limitations 
of the present study. The first extension is that it is critical for the study of police, not only 
in terms of trust but also in terms of the information available about police departments, to 
have a deploy a standardized law enforcement survey taken at regular and routine intervals 
that includes some measures of public attitudes and behaviors towards police. The Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) series provides some 
portion of this data already, but it has two serious limitations. First, LEMAS is conducted 
every three to five years instead of every year, which is an issue because departmental 
priorities and funding can vary over time, and this leads to changes in the police services 
offered. With data collected every three to five years it is difficult to detect how these 
changes were brought about: perhaps there was a police surge followed by a gradual draw 
down of officers or perhaps a community policing unit was found to be compromised, 
leading to its dissolution. Knowing more about the department from year to year can aid 
greatly in utilizing police data with other data sets. The second issue is that LEMAS surveys 
change each time they are deployed making comparison longitudinal panel analysis 
impossible on all but the most general characteristics of departments. Having these surveys 
standardized will improve the type of analyses that can be conducted with this data. 
Another extension is the need for an update to existing social capital and trust data 
in the United States. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS) 2000 and 2006 remain 
some of the richest data sources for researcher looking to study these topics but they are at 
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the time of writing over thirteen years old. Further, only the SCBS is geocoded so it is not 
even possible to look at how levels of social capital or trust change over time (also means 
they can’t be used as a panel). This is a problem for researchers looking to measure the 
effects of new police strategies and tactics on perceptions of police in the population 
served, such as is the case with procedural fairness, police performance and impartiality. It 
is likely the case that smaller, department specific databases exist that contain some of this 
data, but the lack of general availability of these databases and their lack of standardization 
means that they are not widely comparable which makes comparison over time studies 
difficult. A survey like the European Social Survey, which was used for one of the 
empirical articles in the present study, which is conducted every 2 years, and which adds 
new modules over time would be ideal in the American context, particularly if that data 
was geocoded. 
108 
REFERENCES 
Abu-Lughod, J.L. (2007). Race, space, and riots in Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles. 
OUP USA. 
Acock, A. C. (2013). Discovering structural equation modeling using Stata: Revised 
edition. Stata press. 
Alpert, G. P., & Moore, M. H. (1993). Measuring police performance in the new 
paradigm of policing. Performance measures for the criminal justice system, 109-
142. 
-----, Flynn, D., & Piquero, A. R. (2001). Effective community policing performance 
measures. Justice Research and Policy, 3(2), 79-94. 
Arthur, W. B. (1994). Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. 
University of Michigan Press. 
Barnes, T. D., Beaulieu, E., & Saxton, G. W. (2018). Restoring trust in the police: Why 
female officers reduce suspicions of corruption. Governance, 31(1), 143-161. 
Becker, S. O., Boeckh, K., Hainz, C., & Woessmann, L. (2016). The empire is dead, long 
live the empire! Long‐run persistence of trust and corruption in the 
bureaucracy. The Economic Journal, 126(590), 40-74. 
Blader, S. L., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). A four-component model of procedural justice: 
Defining the meaning of a “fair” process. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29(6), 747-758. 
Bottoms, A., & Tankebe, J. (2012). Beyond procedural justice: A dialogic approach to 
legitimacy in criminal justice. J. Crim. L. & Criminology, 102, 119. 
Brunson, R. K. (2007). “Police don't like black people”: African‐American young men's 
accumulated police experiences. Criminology & public policy, 6(1), 71-101. 
-----, & Miller, J. (2006). Gender, race, and urban policing: The experience of African 
American youths. Gender & Society, 20(4), 531-552. 
-----, & Weitzer, R. (2009). Police relations with black and white youths in different 
urban neighborhoods. Urban Affairs Review, 44(6), 858-885. 
109 
-----, & Weitzer, R. (2011). Negotiating unwelcome police encounters: The 
intergenerational transmission of conduct norms. Journal of contemporary 
ethnography, 40(4), 425-456. 
Buonanno, P., & Vargas, J. F. (2017). Inequality, crime, and the long run legacy of 
slavery. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 
Bursik, R., & Grasmick, H. (1993). Neighborhoods and crime: The dimensions of 
effective community control. New York: Lexington Books. 
Carr, P. J., Napolitano, L., & Keating, J. (2007). We never call the cops and here is why: 
A qualitative examination of legal cynicism in three Philadelphia 
neighborhoods. Criminology, 45(2), 445-480. 
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2007). The spread of obesity in a large social network 
over 32 years. New England journal of medicine, 357(4), 370-379. 
Connell, N. M., Miggans, K., & McGloin, J. M. (2008). Can a community policing 
initiative reduce serious crime? A local evaluation. Police quarterly, 11(2), 127-
150. 
The Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 5. 
Cordner, G. W. (2001). Elements of community policing. In L.K. Gaines and G.W. 
Cordner (Eds.), Policing Perspectives: An anthology (pp. 137-149). Loss 
Angeles: Roxbury. 
Crank, J. P. (1994). Watchman and community: Myth and institutionalization in 
policing. Law & Soc'y Rev., 28, 325. 
-----, & Langworthy, R. (1992). Institutional perspective on policing. J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology, 83, 338. 
Crowl, J. N. (2017). The effect of community policing on fear and crime reduction, 
police legitimacy and job satisfaction: an empirical review of the evidence. Police 
Practice and Research, 18(5), 449-462. 
Engel, R. S. (2005). Citizens' perceptions of distributive and procedural injustice during 
traffic stops with police. Journal of research in crime and delinquency, 42(4), 
445-481. 
Epp, C. R., Maynard-Moody, S., & Haider-Markel, D. P. (2014). Pulled over: How 
police stops define race and citizenship. University of Chicago Press. 
110 
Feagin, J. R. (1991). The continuing significance of race: Antiblack discrimination in 
public places. American sociological review, 101-116. 
Fielding, N. G. (2005). Concepts and theory in community policing. The Howard journal 
of criminal justice, 44(5), 460-472. 
Fisher-Stewart, G. (2007). Community policing explained: A guide for local governments. 
Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services. 
Fogelson, R. M. (1977). Big-city police. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Ford, J. K., Weissbein, D. A., & Plamondon, K. E. (2003). Distinguishing organizational 
from strategy commitment: Linking officers' commitment to community policing 
to job behaviors and satisfaction. Justice quarterly, 20(1), 159-185. 
Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2008). Dynamic spread of happiness in a large social 
network: longitudinal analysis over 20 years in the Framingham Heart 
Study. Bmj, 337, a2338. 
Fujiwara, T., Laudares, H., & Caicedo, F. V. (2017). Tordesillas, Slavery and the Origins 
of Brazilian Inequality.”. Sl: sn. 
Gatignon, H. (2010). Confirmatory Factor Analysis in Statistical analysis of management 
data. DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-1270-1_4 
Gau, J. M. (2011). The convergent and discriminant validity of procedural justice and 
police legitimacy: An empirical test of core theoretical propositions. Journal of 
Criminal Justice, 39(6), 489-498. 
-----, & Brunson, R. K. (2012). “One Question Before You Get Gone...” Consent Search 
Requests as a Threat to Perceived Stop Legitimacy. Race and Justice, 2(4), 250-
273. 
-----. (2013). Consent searches as a threat to procedural justice and police legitimacy: An 
analysis of consent requests during traffic stops. Criminal justice policy 
review, 24(6), 759-777. 
Gill, C., Weisburd, D., Telep, C. W., Vitter, Z., & Bennett, T. (2014). Community-
oriented policing to reduce crime, disorder and fear and increase satisfaction and 
legitimacy among citizens: A systematic review. Journal of Experimental 
Criminology, 10(4), 399-428. 
Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point: How little things can make a big difference. 
Little, Brown. 
111 
 
 
Goetzke, F., & Weinberger, R. (2012). Separating contextual from endogenous effects in 
automobile ownership models. Environment and Planning A, 44(5), 1032-1046. 
 
Goffman, E. (1978). The presentation of self in everyday life. London: Harmondsworth. 
 
Grodzins, M. (1957). Metropolitan segregation. Scientific American, 197(4), 33-41. 
 
Greene, J. R. (1987). Foot patrol and community policing: Past practices and future 
prospects. American Journal of Police, 6, 1. 
 
-----. (1989). Police officer job satisfaction and community perceptions: Implications for 
community-oriented policing. Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, 26(2), 168-183. 
 
-----. (2000). Community policing in America: Changing the nature, structure, and 
function of the police. Criminal justice, 3(3), 299-370. 
 
-----, & Mastrofski, S. D. (Eds.). (1988). Community policing: Rhetoric or reality. New 
York: Praeger. 
 
-----, & Taylor, R. B. (1988). Community-based policing and foot patrol: Issues of theory 
and evaluation. Community policing: Rhetoric or reality, 195-224. 
 
Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: A problem-oriented approach. Crime & 
delinquency, 25(2), 236-258. 
 
Grodzins, M. (1957). Metropolitan segregation. Scientific American, 197(4), 33-41. 
 
Halbwachs, M. (1992). On collective memory. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Hinds, L., & Murphy, K. (2007). Public satisfaction with police: Using procedural justice 
to improve police legitimacy. Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, 40(1), 27-42. 
 
Hough, M., Jackson, J. and Bradford, B. (2013) ‘Legitimacy, Trust and Compliance: An 
Empirical Test of Procedural Justice Theory Using the European Social Survey’, 
in Tankebe, J. and Liebling, A. (eds.) Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An 
International Exploration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hooper, D., Coughlan, J., & Mullen, M.R. (2008). Structural equation modelling: 
Guidelines for determining model fit. Journal of Business Research Methods, 6, 
53–60. 
 
112 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 6(1), 1-55. 
Jackson, J., Hough, M., Bradford, B., Hohl, K., & Kuha, J. (2012). Policing by consent: 
understanding the dynamics of police power and legitimacy. European Social 
Survey (2012).‘Policing by consent: Understanding the dynamics of police power 
and legitimacy’, ESS Country Specific Topline Results Series, (1). 
Jones, T., & van Steden, R. (2013). Democratic police governance in comparative 
perspective: Reflections from England & Wales and the Netherlands. Policing: 
An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 36(3), 561-576. 
Kaplan, Jacob (2019). Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Offenses Known and 
Clearances by Arrest, 1960-2017. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-02-10. 
https://doi.org/10.3886/E100707V10 
Kelling, G. L., & Moore, M. H. (1988). From political to reform to community: The 
evolving strategy of police. In J.R. Greene & S.D. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community 
policing: Rhetoric or reality?. New York: Praeger. 
-----, Pate, T., Dieckman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). The Kansas City Preventive Patrol 
Experiment: A Tecnical Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 
-----, & Coles, C. M. (1997). Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and reducing 
crime in our communities. Simon and Schuster. 
King, R. D., Messner, S. F., & Baller, R. D. (2009). Contemporary hate crimes, law 
enforcement, and the legacy of racial violence. American Sociological 
Review, 74(2), 291-315. 
Kline, R. B. (2016). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. Guilford 
publications. 
Liebowitz, S. & Margolis, S. (2000). Path Dependency. In Bouckaert, Boudewijn and De 
Geest, Gerrit (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume I. The History 
and Methodology of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Lind, E. A., & Tyler, T. R. (1988). The social psychology of procedural justice. Springer 
Science & Business Media. 
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public 
service. Russell Sage Foundation. 
113 
Lurigio, A. J., & Rosenbaum, D. P. (1986). Evaluation research in community crime 
prevention: A critical look at the field. Community crime prevention: Does it 
work, 19-44. 
MacDonald, J., & Stokes, R. J. (2006). Race, social capital, and trust in the police. Urban 
Affairs Review, 41(3), 358-375. 
Manski, C. F. (1993). Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection 
problem. The review of economic studies, 60(3), 531-542. 
Martinson, R. (1974). What works?-Questions and answers about prison reform. The 
public interest, 35, 22. 
Mastrofski, S. D. (1988). Community policing as reform: A cautionary tale. In J.R. 
Greene & S.D. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community policing: Rhetoric or reality (47-
68). New York: Praeger. 
-----, Willis, J. J., & Kochel, T. R. (2007). The challenges of implementing community 
policing in the United States. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 1(2), 
223-234. 
Maynard-Moody, S., & Leland, S. (2000). Stories from the front lines of public 
management: Street-level workers as responsible actors. In H. Rainey and J. 
Brudney (eds.) Advancing public management: New developments in theory, 
methods, and practice. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Maynard-Moody, S. W., Musheno, M., & Musheno, M. C. (2003). Cops, teachers, 
counselors: Stories from the front lines of public service. University of Michigan 
Press. 
Messner, S. F., Rosenfeld, R., & Baumer, E. P. (2004). Dimensions of social capital and 
rates of criminal homicide. American Sociological Review, 69(6), 882-903. 
Moore, M. H., & Trojanowicz, R. C. (1988). Policing and the fear of crime (No. 3). 
Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 
-----, Trojanowicz, R., & Kelling, G. L. (1988). Crime and Policing. Perspectives on 
Policing. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. 
-----, & Kelling, G. L. (1983). To serve and protect: Learning from police history. The 
Public Interest, (70), 49-65. 
Moravcová, E. (2016). Willingness to cooperate with the police in four Central European 
countries. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 22(1), 171-187. 
114 
Morenoff, J. D., Sampson, R. J., & Raudenbush, S. W. (2001). Neighborhood inequality, 
collective efficacy, and the spatial dynamics of urban 
violence. Criminology, 39(3), 517-558. 
Murphy, K., & Tyler, T. R. (2017). Experimenting with procedural justice 
policing. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 13(3), 287-292. 
Nix, J., Wolfe, S. E., Rojek, J., & Kaminski, R. J. (2015). Trust in the police: The 
influence of procedural justice and perceived collective efficacy. Crime & 
Delinquency, 61(4), 610-640. 
Norman, J. (2017). Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average. Digitally published 
July 10, 2017. Gallup, Inc. Retrieved March 26, 2018, from 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-
average.aspx 
Nunn, N. (2009). The importance of history for economic development. Annu. Rev. 
Econ., 1(1), 65-92. 
O'Brien, R. M. (1996). Police productivity and crime rates: 1973‐
1992. Criminology, 34(2), 183-207. 
Oliver, W. M., & Bartgis, E. (1998). Community policing: a conceptual 
framework. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, 21(3), 490-509. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge University Press. 
-----, & Ahn, T. K. (2008). The meaning of social capital and its link to collective 
action. Handbook of social capital: The troika of sociology, political science and 
economics, 17-35. 
-----, & Whitaker, G. P. (1973). Does local community control of police make a 
difference? Some preliminary findings. American journal of political science, 48-
76. 
-----, & Whitaker, G. P. (1974). Community control and governmental responsiveness: 
the case of police in black neighborhoods. Improving the quality of urban 
management, 303-34. 
Parks, R. B., Baker, P. C., Kiser, L., Oakerson, R., Ostrom, E., Ostrom, V., Percy, S. L., 
Vandivort, M. B., Whitaker, G. P., & Wilson, R. (1981). Consumers as 
coproducers of public services: Some economic and institutional 
considerations. Policy Studies Journal, 9(7), 1001-1011. 
115 
Petersen, N., & Ward, G. (2015). The transmission of historical racial violence: 
Lynching, civil rights–era terror, and contemporary interracial homicide. Race 
and Justice, 5(2), 114-143. 
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of 
politics. American political science review, 94(2), 251-267. 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015). Final report of the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services 
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. In Culture and 
politics (pp. 223-234). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 
Ranaweera, C., & Prabhu, J. (2003). On the relative importance of customer satisfaction 
and trust as determinants of customer retention and positive word of 
mouth. Journal of Targeting, Measurement and Analysis for marketing, 12(1), 82-
90. 
Reisig, M. D., Tankebe, J., & Mesko, G. (2014). Compliance with the law in Slovenia: 
The role of procedural justice and police legitimacy. European Journal on 
Criminal Policy and Research, 20(2), 259-276. 
Rosenbaum, D. P. (1988). Community crime prevention: A review and synthesis of the 
literature. Justice Quarterly, 5(3), 323-395. 
Rosenfeld, R., Baumer, E. P., & Messner, S. F. (2001). Social capital and 
homicide. Social Forces, 80(1), 283-310. 
-----, & Lurigio, A. J. (1994). An Inside Look at Community Policing Reform: 
Definitions, Organizational Changes, and Evaluation Findings. Crime & 
Delinquency, 40(3), 299-314. 
Rothstein, B. (2005). Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge University Press. 
-----. (2011). The Quality of Government: Corruption, social trust, and inequality in 
international perspective. University of Chicago Press. 
-----, & Teorell, J.A. (2008a). What is quality of government? A theory of impartial 
government institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165-190. 
-----, & Teorell, J.A. (2008b). Impartiality as a basic norm for the quality of government: 
A reply to Francisco Longo and Graham Wilson. Governance, 21(2), 201-204. 
Sadd, S., & Grinc, R. M. (1994). Innovative neighborhood-oriented policing: 
Descriptions of programs in eight cities. New York: Vera Institute of Justice. 
116 
Saguaro Seminar. John F. Kennedy School of Government. Social Capital Benchmark 
Survey (SCBS): 2000. Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
[distributor], 2001-03-01. <https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/featured-
collections/2000-social-capital-community-benchmark-survey>. 
Sampson, R. (2011). The Community Approach. In J.Q. Wilson & J. Petersilia 
(Eds.). Crime and public policy. Oxford University Press. 
-----. (2012). Great American city: Chicago and the enduring neighborhood effect. 
University of Chicago Press. 
-----. (2013). The place of context: a theory and strategy for criminology's hard 
problems. Criminology, 51(1), 1-31. 
-----, & Bartusch, D. J. (1998). Legal cynicism and (subcultural) tolerance of deviance: 
the neighborhood context of racial difference. Law & Soc'y Rev., 32, 777. 
-----, & Groves, W. B. (1989). Community structure and crime: Testing social-
disorganization theory. American journal of sociology, 94(4), 774-802. 
-----, Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and violent crime: A 
multilevel study of collective efficacy. Science, 277(5328), 918-924. 
-----, & Raudenbush, S. W. (1999). Systematic social observation of public spaces: A 
new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods. American journal of 
sociology, 105(3), 603-651. 
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of mathematical 
sociology, 1(2), 143-186. 
Skogan, W. (1986). Fear of crime and neighborhood change. Crime and justice, 8, 203-
229. 
Skolnick, J. H., & Bayley, D. H. (1988). The new blue line: Police innovation in six 
American cities. Simon and Schuster. 
Sharp, E. B., & Johnson, P. E. (2009). Accounting for variation in distrust of local 
police. Justice Quarterly, 26(1), 157-182. 
Spelman, W., & Brown, D. K. (1984). Calling the police: Citizen reporting of serious 
crime. US Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 
117 
 
Sun, I., Hu, R., & Wu, Y. (2012). Social capital, political participation, and trust in the 
police in urban China. Australian & New Zealand journal of criminology, 45(1), 
87-105. 
 
Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in 
shaping public support for policing. Law & society review, 37(3), 513-548. 
 
Tankebe, J. (2008). Colonialism, legitimation, and policing in Ghana. International 
Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 36(1), 67-84. 
 
-----. (2009a). Public cooperation with the police in Ghana: Does procedural fairness 
matter?. Criminology, 47(4), 1265-1293. 
 
-----. (2009b). Policing, procedural fairness and public behaviour: A review and 
critique. International Journal of Police Science & Management, 11(1), 8-19. 
 
Teeger, C. (2014). Collective memory and collective fear: How South Africans use the 
past to explain crime. Qualitative sociology, 37(1), 69-92. 
 
Thomas, D. J. (n.d.). Law Enforcement Must Regain the Public's Trust. Retrieved March 
26, 2018, from https://www.policefoundation.org/law-enforcement-must-regain-
the-publics-trust/ 
 
Trojanowicz, R. (1986). Evaluating a neighborhood foot patrol program: The Flint, 
Michigan Project: In D Rosenbaum edited. Community crime prevention: Does it 
work? Beverly Hills. 
 
-----, Kappeler, V. E., Gaines, L. K., & Bucqueroux, B. (1998). Community Policing: A 
Contemporary Perspective. Cincinnati: Anderson. 
 
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why People Obey the Law. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
-----. (2003). Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law. Crime and 
justice, 30, 283-357. 
 
-----. (2005). Policing in black and white: Ethnic group differences in trust and 
confidence in the police. Police quarterly, 8(3), 322-342. 
 
-----, & Blader, S. (2000). Cooperation in groups: Procedural justice, social identity, and 
behavioral engagement. Routledge. 
 
-----, & Fagan, J. (2008). Legitimacy and cooperation: Why do people help the police 
fight crime in their communities. Ohio St. J. Crim. L., 6, 231. 
 
-----, & Huo, Y. (2002). Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the police 
and courts. Russell Sage Foundation. 
118 
-----, & Lind, E. A. (1992). A relational model of authority in groups. In Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 115-191). Academic Press. 
U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000, Summary File 1, 2, 3. Generated by Matt Fischer. 
Using American FactFinder. <http://factfinder.census.gov>. (01 February 2019) 
U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS): 2000 Sample 
Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2008-12-08. 
https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03565.v2 
Weisburd, D., & Eck, J. E. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder, and 
fear?. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 593(1), 42-65. 
Weitzer, R., & Tuch, S. A. (1999). Race, class, and perceptions of discrimination by the 
police. Crime & Delinquency, 45(4), 494-507. 
Williams, H., & Pate, A. M. (1987). Returning to first principles: Reducing the fear of 
crime in Newark. Crime & Delinquency, 33(1), 53-70. 
Williamson, T. (2010). Sprawl, justice, and citizenship: The civic costs of the American 
way of life. Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, W. J. (2012). The truly disadvantaged: The inner city, the underclass, and public 
policy. University of Chicago Press. 
-----, & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows. Atlantic monthly, 249(3), 29-38. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Nelson 
Education. 
Zhao, J., & Thurman, Q. C. (1997). Community policing: Where are we now?. Crime & 
Delinquency, 43(3), 345-357. 
-----, He, N., & Lovrich, N. P. (2003). Community policing: Did it change the basic 
functions of policing in the 1990s? A national follow-up study. Justice 
Quarterly, 20(4), 697-724. 
-----, Lovrich, N. P., & Robinson, T. H. (2001). Community policing: is it changing the 
basic functions of policing?: Findings from a longitudinal study of 200+ 
municipal police agencies. Journal of criminal justice, 29(5), 365-377. 
119 
-----, Thurman, Q. C., & Lovrich, N. P. (1995). Community-oriented policing across the 
US: Facilitators and impediment to implementation. Am. J. Police, 14, 11. 
120 
CURRICULUM VITA 
NAME: Matthew Robert Fischer 
ADDRESS: Department of Urban and Public Affairs 
426 W Bloom St 
University of Louisville 
Louisville, KY 40292 
DOB: Milwaukee, Wisconsin – March 8, 1980 
EDUCATION 
& TRAINING: B.A., Philosophy 
University of Wisconsin - Madison 
2005-2007 
M.A., Arabic Studies 
University of Michigan 
2007-2009 
Ph.D., Urban and Public Affairs 
University of Louisville 
2015-2019 
AWARDS: University Fellowship, University of Louisville 
2015-2017 
 
